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**The 2010 NATO strategic concept: What are
the divergent interests between USA and
France?**

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Table of Contents

Introduction	p. 1
Chapter 1. The Deterrence Force of NATO	p. 5
1.1 The different perceptions of threat	p. 5
1.2 The Nuclear policy of France and the USA	p. 8
1.3 The power projection of France and the USA	p. 13
Chapter 2. The peace building role of NATO and ESDP	p. 18
2.1 The American and French perception of the ESDP	p. 18
2.2 The different views over the role of NATO	p. 21
2.3 The ESDP and NATO relationship	p. 28
Chapter 3. The Partnership Policy of France and the USA	p. 32
3.1 The Military commitments of France and the USA	p. 33
3.2 The economic ties and energetic dependencies of both countries	p. 38
3.3 The strategic divergences of the 2 countries toward Turkey	p. 42
Conclusion	p. 46
Bibliography	p. 49
Appendix I	p. 63
Appendix II	p. 64
Appendix III	p. 71

Abstract :

In 2010, the Head of States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will adopt a new Strategic Concept which will determine the future orientation of this institution. The objective of this dissertation is to highlight the main discrepancies between the USA, the most powerful state within NATO, and France, leader of the Allied Command Transformation military command and main contributor to NATO. The 2 countries have officially stated a closer relationship since the changing of their administration and this dissertation will consider to what extent these official statements are verified empirically. The study also considers the influence the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) exert on their defence policy.

This dissertation will demonstrate that this rapprochement has been limited by the different military and economic capacities France and the USA can rely on, as well as their different military projections, their divergent foreign policy and their diverse geographical orientation.

Their most relevant discrepancies concern their approach toward Turkey, the US Ballistic Missile Defense policy for Europe, and their different conception of ESDP and NATO. The hypothesis formulated in the title is then confirmed, besides official opposite statements, even if a real rapprochement between both countries has also been established.

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Abbreviations :

ACT: Allied Command Transformation

AFRICOM: USA Africa Command

CFDP: European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy

CJTF HOA: Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa

DPC: Defense Planning Committee

EADS: European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company

ESDP: European Security and Defense Policy

EU: European Union

EUFOR: European Union Force

EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IFOR: Implementation Force (NATO Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina)

KFOR: Kosovo Force

LAF: Lebanese Armed Forces

MAP: Membership Action Plan

NAC: North Atlantic Council

NAT: North Atlantic Treaty

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVFOR: European Union Naval Force Somalia

NBC: nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

NRF: NATO Response Force

UMP: Union pour un Mouvement Populaire

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SFOR: Stabilization Force (NATO Military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina)

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USA: United States of America

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

“I want to be your friend, your ally and your partner.”¹ It is with these words that Nicolas Sarkozy expressed himself in 2007, in front of the Congress of the United States of America (USA). On the 30th March 2010 at the White House, President Sarkozy declared: “Rarely in the history of both countries, has the community of views been so identical between the United States of America and France.”² Officially, the power projection of France and the United States are then completely in line with each other. One of the most relevant demonstrations of this renewed relationship is the reintegration of France within NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)’s military structures in April 2009, an assumption of responsibilities before a key moment: the negotiation of the 2010 new strategic concept of NATO. At the inauguration day of the Obama Presidency, polls confirmed the revival of French and American closeness, with 72 per cent of the French considering as positive the influence Obama could have on peace in the world, and 62% of the Americans sharing a positive opinion on France.³ However, apart from public opinion and official statements, some scholars, such as Cox, believe that the Iraq crisis highlighted the different interests that transatlantic allies could have on security issues and the deviating foreign policies pursued by

¹ **Embassy of France in the United States**, 2007, *Speech by President Nicolas Sarkozy before the Congress of the United States of America*, Available at: <<http://www.info-france-usa.org/spip.php?article62>> [accessed 03/08/2010], 07/11/2007.

² **Embassy of France in the United States**, 2010, Available at: <<http://www.info-france-usa.org/spip.php?rubrique9>> [Accessed 20/08/2010].

³ **CSA.eu**, 2009, *CSA, Le Parisien and Aujourd’hui en France Poll, Les espoirs des Français à l’égard de Barack Obama avant son investiture*, Available at: <<http://www.csa.eu/dataset/data2009/opi20090115-les-espoirs-des-francais-a-l-egard-de-barack-obama-avant-son-investiture.htm>> (accessed 03/08/2010), 18/01/2009.

CNN, 2010, *Opinion Research Corporation Poll: Allies and Enemies*, in Pollingreport.com, 16/06/2010, Available at: <<http://www.pollingreport.com/nations.htm>> [accessed 17/08/2010].

France and United States (USA) since then.⁴ It is interesting to question the range of their competitive interests while both administrations have changed.

The aim of this dissertation is to challenge the official and declared policies of the French and American administrations, by comparing the conduct of their foreign policies in the military field and thus demonstrating how much these policies are in competition with each other. In May 2010, a report was published for NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on NATO's future strategic concept, written by twelve independent experts chaired by Madeleine Albright. Furthering Albright's report, the negotiations between NATO members will now "redefine NATO's mission (a new strategic concept), its framework (partnerships, enlargement) and its functioning (decision-making process, the role of Europeans)."⁵ The second objective of my essay is then to understand the current cleavages and divergent interests on security issues between France and United States in order to appreciate the parameters which will influence the negotiation toward the future NATO's strategic concept.

In order to understand the competitive behavior of France and the United States, I will compare primary sources, through the study of official white papers on defence, official speeches from state representatives, Madeleine Albright's report on the new Strategic Concept for NATO and the interviews of Jamie Shea (director of policy planning at NATO), lieutenant-colonel Emmanuel Charpy (NATO Policy Adviser), and an official from the US at NATO who agreed to speak in confidence. I will also examine secondary sources of both countries, such as newspapers and journals' articles, e-journals, or relevant books. I will then be able to reveal

⁴ **Cox** Michael, 2005, *Beyond the West: Terror in Transatlantia*, Europeans Journal of International Relations, 203-33, 11/02/2005, p.208.

⁵ **Bozo** Frédéric, 2008, *France and NATO under Sarkozy: end of the French exception?*, Working Paper, Fondation pour l'innovation politique:Paris, March 2008, p.6.

the main discrepancies between French and American foreign policy toward NATO and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and on other key issues.

The choice of these countries was obvious. Both countries are great powers⁶ and large NATO contributors, being then able to exert substantial influence in international affairs. While the United States remains the leader in economic and military matters, France is a pillar of the EU and ESDP. Both countries have seen the introduction of new administrations, elected on the promise of a break from the former government's policy. Both leaders proclaim that their respective country is based on and follows universal values,⁷ having a "civilizing mission" (mission civilisatrice).⁸ The period of analysis starts with Sarkozy's taking of office at the Elysée (16th May 2007) and the entrance of Obama at the White House (20th January 2009), focusing in particular on the time they have in common as head of state (from 20th January 2009 to 15th September 2010).

⁶ **Lemke** Douglas, 2005, *Great Power in the Post Cold War World: a power transition perspective*, in **Paul T. V., Wirtz** James J., **Fortmann** Michel, **Balance of power: theory and practice in the 21st century**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 59: "Accordingly, the great powers after the Cold War are Britain, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States."

⁷ For United States : **US Department of State**, 2010, *The National Security Strategy*, May 2010, Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf > [accessed 03/08/2010], p.35: "The United States believes certain values are universal and will work to promote them worldwide.[...]The United States was founded upon a belief in these values."
For France: **Embassy of France in the United States**, 2010, *Speech of N. Sarkozy at the Knesset*, Jerusalem, 23/06/2010, Available at: <http://www.un-echo-israel.net/Document-integralite-du-discours> > [accessed 03/08/2010]: « l'inspiration que les Pères fondateurs d'Israël ont puisée dans les valeurs de l'universalisme français » ; **Elysée.fr**, 2007, *speech of N. Sarkozy at his induction's ceremony*, Paris, 16/05/2007, Available at: http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/2007/mai/allocution_de_m_ni_colas_sarkozy_president_de_la_republique_a_l_occasion_de_la_ceremonie_d_installation_76633.html > [accessed 03/08/2010]: "Je pense à Jacques Chirac, qui pendant douze ans a œuvré pour la paix et fait rayonner dans le monde les valeurs universelles de la France ».

⁸ **Chicagotribune.com**, 2009, *speech of B. Obama at the inauguration day*, Available at: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/obama/chi-obama-speech-090120_0,1085546.story?page=2 > [accessed 27/08/2010]: "Know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more."
Belkin Paul, 2010, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations*, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 20/05/2010, Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32464.pdf> > [accessed 30/08/2010], p.4.

In the first part of this essay, I examine the competitive power projection of France and the USA through the deterrence role of NATO, analyzing their established threat discernment, their nuclear policy, and their broad military strategy. Secondly, I focus on their perception of NATO collective military action, evaluating their respective positions toward the role of NATO, their vision of ESDP and the possibilities of cooperation between both frameworks. Thirdly, I compare the French and American partnership policies, through their military commitments, and their main energy and economic dependencies which could influence divergent foreign policies. A part is dedicated to their respective policy toward Turkey, crystalizing many divergences between the USA and France. I will conclude that, while France seems to follow the USA where it does not have a strategic advantage, the competition remains tough when France holds a competitive advantage. Moreover, their collaboration is significantly limited, mainly by their diverse military and financial capacities, their different geographical position, and their individual military strategies. Their relative position toward the new NATO strategic concept thus has a potential for conflict.

Chapter 1. The Deterrence Force of NATO

1.1 The different perceptions of threat

According to Beck, terrorism is an enemy-image created by the state in order to open new strategic military options.⁹ Accordingly, the threat determination legitimates the means to model physically and mentally the political map of the world. Bearing in mind this conception, I will analyze the US and French categorization of terrorists and the ballistic missile attacks, which are the two most important threats identified by Albright's experts group.¹⁰

There is no French list of terrorist organizations, but a European list voted for unanimously by the EU Council members.¹¹ On the 26th January 2009, the EU recognized 47 organizations as terrorists,¹² updated to 29 on the 22th December 2009.¹³ Today, the USA considers 45 organizations as terrorist.¹⁴ Comparing the EU's January terrorist list with the American one, it appears that 20 terrorists organizations were different, almost half of them.

⁹ Beck Ulrich, 2005, *War Is Peace: On Post-National War*, Security Dialogue 36(1): 5–26, p.24.

¹⁰ Albright Madeleine K, 2010, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO*, 17/05/2010, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf> [accessed 04/08/2010], p.11.

¹¹ Fragnoli Thierry, 2009, *De la relativité appliquée au terrorisme*, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, La Revue Internationale et stratégique N° 75, Spring 2009, p.25.

¹² Official Journal of the EU, 2009, *Council Common Position 2009/67/CFSP of 26 January 2009, updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2008/586/CFSP*, Available at: <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:0042:EN:PDF>> [accessed 05/08/2010].

¹³ Official Journal of the EU, 2009, *Council Decision 2009/1004/CFSP, 22/12/2009 for updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism*, Available at: <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:346:0058:0060:EN:PDF>> [accessed 05/08/2010], p.3.

¹⁴ US Department of State, 2010, *US list of terrorist organization*, 05/08/2010, Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm>> [accessed 05/08/2010] and US Department of State, 2010, *US list of foreign terrorist organizations*, Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>> [accessed 07/08/2010].

Comparing the new EU December terrorist list with the American one, 9 of the 29 Terrorist Organizations do not appear in the American list, and more than half of the organizations listed in the American list differ from the European list. 2/3 of the disparities between the American and the European terrorist lists concern South Asia. However, both countries identified the same terrorist organizations linked to radical Islam. One exception is Hezbollah, not considered as a terrorist organization by the EU,¹⁵ which allows a possibility of different geopolitical involvement in Middle East issues. Moreover, in France and the US, there are similarities in the identification of those deemed dangerous. In France, a connection has been established between African immigration and criminal activities,¹⁶ while in the United States the construction of a Mosque near ground zero¹⁷ or the disapproval of Obama's policy engendered by his presumed Muslim religion¹⁸ reveal a latent "Islamophobia." US and France have then predominantly convergent securitization focus and security threats, but not entirely.

Today, another big threat for the officials of the major powers is the proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons,¹⁹ particularly exemplified in their struggle against the Iranian nuclear program. According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Iranian Nuclear program remains legal. However, the lack of Iranian cooperation with IAEA inspectors in 2004 has, from then on, created tensions with Western countries, suspicious that

¹⁵ **Win Rees**, 2009, *Inside Out: the External Face of EU International Security Policy*, in **Jones Erik, Van Genugten Sakia**, *The future of European foreign policy*, Routledge: New York, p.105.

¹⁶ **Europe1.fr**, *Speech of Lefebvre Patrice, Spokesman of UMP*: "delinquency is linked to immigration", 05/08/2010, Available at: <<http://www.europe1.fr/Politique/Lefebvre-le-PS-quel-culot-!-246780>> [accessed 07/08/2010] ; **Dover Robert**, 2010, **Toward a Common EU Immigration Policy**, in **Jones Erik**, *ibid*, p. 113.

¹⁷ **Rosenthal Andrew**, 2010, *Mistrust and the mosque*, 02/09/2010, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/opinion/03fri1.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=mosque%20ground%20zero&st=cse> [accessed 08/09/2010].

¹⁸ **Montopoli Brian**, 2010, *Does America Hate Islam?*, 19/08/2010, Available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_16220014152503544.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CBSNewsTheEarlyShowLeisure+%28CBS+News%3A+The+Early+Show%3A+Leisure%29> [accessed 28/08/2010].

¹⁹ **Ministère de la Défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/livre_blanc_1337/livre_blanc_1340/index.html> [accessed 04/08/2010], p.69.

Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.²⁰ If Iran is building ballistic missiles, their range can reach and then threaten NATO members.²¹ Moreover, the development of Iranian WMD increases its regional power, a prospect that the EU and the USA try to avoid.²² Since the check of the EU-3 negotiations and the bilateral negotiations started in June 2009,²³ France is against softening any measures against Iran.²⁴ However, the USA has already “run out of sanctions that it can apply to Iran individually” being then more ready to negotiate with Iran, especially after conceding to being overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan (which reduces its deterrent posture).²⁵ In addition to bandwagoning Washington on economic sanctions,²⁶ Paris also succeeds in exploiting Iran’s threat in order to develop a deeper military partnership with Abu Dhabi (cf part 1.3). Then, through the securitization of the Iranian threat, France tries to exert a relative balancing toward the US power projection in the Middle East.

The threat perception is also linked to the sensitivity toward Russia, particularly after the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. I also noticed that Russia provides nuclear power reactor and conventional arms sales to Iran.²⁷ France is much keener to cooperate with Russia,²⁸ as demonstrated by its commitment to find an agreement with

²⁰ **Cirincione** Joseph, **Wolfsthal** Jon. B., **Rajkumar** Miriam, 2005, *Deadly arsenals, nuclear, biological, and chemical threats*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, chapter 15.

²¹ **Facon** Isabelle, 2009, *Great Power Deterrence relationships: Russia, The United States and Europe*, in **Kamp** Karl Heinz, **Yost** David S., 2009, *NATO and the 21st Century Deterrence*, NATO Defense College: NDC Forum Paper 08, Roma, May 2009, p.116.

²² **Pakzad** Karim, 2010, *Pourquoi une nouvelle résolution du Conseil de sécurité contre l’Iran ?*, 11/06/2010, Available at: <<http://www.affaires-strategiques.info/spip.php?article3495>> [accessed 28/08/2010].

²³ **Crumley** Bruce, 2010, *Le pragmatisme en politique étrangère : force ou faiblesse ?*, Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, *La Revue Internationale et stratégique*, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.96.

²⁴ **Mikail** Barah, 2010, *Une diplomatie du pragmatisme aux effets limités au Moyen-Orient?*, Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, *La Revue Internationale et stratégique*, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.148.

²⁵ **Facon** Isabelle, *ibid*, p.121.

²⁶ For France: *EU Council conclusions on Iran’s nuclear programme, 3029th Foreign Affairs Council meeting*, Brussels, 26/07/2010, Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/115968.pdf> [accessed 28/08/2010].

For the United States: **U.S. Treasury Department**, 2010, *Treasury announces target on Iran’s nuclear and Missile Programs*, 16/06/2010, Available at: <<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/June/20100616164919ptellivremos8.663577e-02.html>> [accessed 28/08/2010].

²⁷ **Facon** Isabelle, *ibid*, p.121

²⁸ **Ministère de la Défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, *ibid*, p.38.

President Medvedev in order to end the 2008 Georgian war, or the current sale of Mistral boats.²⁹ The USA, being the most powerful ally of NATO, must reassure Eastern NATO members (threatened by regional instability), but seek in the meantime for a global orientation of NATO, to fight the new dangers of the 21st century (which needs Russian cooperation).³⁰ This compromising position was well developed by Albright's experts group, which acknowledges that "doubts persist" towards Russia, but recommended a deeper security cooperation with Russia.³¹

To conclude, while France and the USA invoke the pursuit of universal values, their threat discernment reveal divergences which allow different geopolitical projections. Moreover, the way to deal with those threats, such as the Iranian nuclear program, do not augur the same military strategy; a hypothesis that has to be confirmed with a deeper analysis in the following parts.

1 . 2 The Nuclear policy of France and the USA

During the Cold War, the concept of strategic deterrence within NATO was synonymous to massive retaliation perpetrated by nuclear weapons.³² Today, the geopolitical environment has changed and the concept of deterrence has to be adapted to different threats. As Naumann advocates, many types of deterrence are available, from economic or energy deterrence to conventional forces deterrence,³³ and it is not clear what deterrence force will be associated

²⁹ **Lille** Samantha, *Mistral : Paris et Moscou toujours en négociations*, Ministère de la défense, 09/09/2010, Available at: <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles2/mistral-paris-et-moscou-toujours-en-negociations>> [accessed 11/09/2010].

³⁰ **Wittman** Klaus, *ibid*, p.18.

³¹ **Albright** Madeleine K, 2010, *NATO2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO*, 17/05/2010, *ibid*, p.10.

³² **Kamp** Karl Heinz , **Yost** David S., 2009, *NATO and the 21st Century Deterrence*, NATO Defense College: NDC Forum Paper 08, Roma, May 2009, p.6.

³³ General **Naumann** Klaus, General **Shalikhvili** John, Field Marshal The Lord Inge, Admiral **Lanxade** Jacques, and General **van den Breemen** Henk, 2010, *Towards a Grand Strategy in an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*, Lunteren, The Netherlands: Noaber Foundation, Available at:

with the new NATO strategic concept.

At the Bucharest Summit, The USA reaffirmed their commitment to protect Europe from ballistic missile proliferation with the “deployment of European-based USA missile defence assets,” and the wish to extend that protection to “all Allied territory.”³⁴ As underlines Yost, many officials and analysts still consider US nuclear weapons on European soil as “an assurance to the allies regarding the seriousness and credibility of US security commitments,” establishing a link between US security commitments (based on NAT Article 5) and its intercontinental nuclear forces.³⁵ The US holds around 200-350 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.³⁶ However, for Rühle, the lasting European-based US nuclear weapons are more an “expression of Allied solidarity” than a “major military asset”, missing an operational relevance in front of the new threats.³⁷ According to the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review, while US will increasingly rely on non-nuclear elements, nuclear weapons keep an important role in deterrence.³⁸ Thus, the US wants to keep NATO as a “nuclear Alliance.”³⁹ The report by the NATO Group of Experts has expressed a preference for the continuation of the US nuclear presence on the continent, sustaining the US ballistic missile defence program.⁴⁰ France seems to sustain this “realist” position, not correlating nuclear disarmament with additional security.⁴¹

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- ³⁴ http://csis.org/files/media/isis/events/080110_grand_strategy.pdf >(accessed 04/08/2010), p.27, 51.
NATO, 2008, *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 03/04/2008, Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm >(accessed 04/08/2010), paragraph 37.
- ³⁵ Yost David S., 2009, *Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 85, No. 4, July 2009, pp. 755-780, p.764.
- ³⁶ Lamond Claudine, Ingram Paul, 2009, *Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states*, British American Security Information Council, Getting to Zero Papers, No.11, 23/01/2009, Available at: <http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.pdf> > [accessed 03/09/2010], p.2.
- ³⁷ Rühle Michael, 2009, *Nuclear Deterrence and Public Diplomacy: facts shaping a new strategic concept*, in Kamp Karl Heinz, *ibid*, p.195.
- ³⁸ US Secretary of Defense, 2010, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, Washington, 06/04/2010, Available at: <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf> > [accessed 29/08/2010], p. Xii.
- ³⁹ Landler Mark, *U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts*, New York Times, 22/04/2010, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html> > [accessed 30/08/2010].
- ⁴⁰ Albright Madeleine K., *ibid*, p.11, 44.
- ⁴¹ Tertrais Bruno, 2010, *Back to Earth: Nuclear Weapons in the 2010s* , 25/6/2010, Available at:

Through the Global Zero Campaign (and the appointment of Ivo Daalder as US ambassador to NATO, supporter of a nuclear free world),⁴² President Obama advocates a total nuclear disarmament. In Tertrais' view, the New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty successfully reduced the US and Russian arsenals to 1,000 total warheads each, but did not deal “with non-deployed strategic weapons and non-strategic weapons” and counting “strategic bomber as ‘one nuclear weapon’, even if it can carry 20.”⁴³ Moreover, Obama’s promises of radical change in defence policy are difficult to be maintained in a context of growing nuclear proliferation, with the risk of cascade proliferation if Iran develops WMDs.

In regard to ballistic missile deterrence, Washington considers that Iran and Syria (as well as North Korea in Asia) are threatening the US and its allies, and therefore an increasing deterrence force, based on nuclear and military deterrence, is necessary in Europe.⁴⁴ This is what is called the Phased Adaptive Approach of US Missile Defense Policy, planned until 2020.⁴⁵ However, it is for budgetary reasons and strategic priorities that France will surely resist the US Missile Defense for Europe and the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System expansion (to intercept short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles up to 3,000 kilometres for the protection of troops) proposed in the New NATO Strategic Concept.⁴⁶

<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari110-2010> [accessed 29/08/2010].

⁴² **Daalder Ivo, Holum John**, 2007, *A nuclear-free world*, www.boston.com, 05/10/2007, Available at: <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/10/05/a_nuclear_free_world/> [accessed 06/09/2010].

⁴³ **Tertrais Bruno**, 2010, *Back to Earth: Nuclear Weapons in the 2010s*, 25/6/2010, ibid.

⁴⁴ **US Department of Defense**, 2010, *Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report*, February 2010, Available at: <http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf> [accessed 30/08/2010], p.5 and 24.

⁴⁵ **The White House**, 2009, *Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe*, 17/09/2009, Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/> [accessed 09/09/2010].

⁴⁶ **Maulny Jean Pierre**, 2010, *New NATO Strategic Concept: a view from France*, Fridriech Ebert Stiftung: Berlin, August 2010, Available at: <<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07409.pdf>> [accessed 20/08/2010], p.5; **Albright Madeleine K**, 2010, *NATO2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and*

In the view of Jamie Shea, the French do not want to sign a blank check for missile defence without knowing what the financial implications will be.⁴⁷

Besides its return into the NATO structure, France will not integrate the Nuclear Planning Group. Paris considers the 1974 Ottawa declaration and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept (which recognize the contribution of France to the deterrence force of NATO) as “the only references concerning the relations between its deterrence force and the nuclear doctrine of NATO.”⁴⁸ In fact, to the contrary of the Naumann report and the US deterrence policy, Paris continues to keep a conservative vision of deterrence, for its own personal protection.⁴⁹ Continuing the position of General De Gaulle, France considers its nuclear arms as a warrantee of the independence of French negotiators in case of crisis.⁵⁰ In Bétermier's view, France always refused to enter into the integrated military structure of NATO as an opposition to the concept of “flexible response”, opting for a “non-use” nuclear policy.⁵¹ At the April 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, France signed the declaration issued by the heads of state and government which stated that “Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.”⁵² Obviously, the

Recommendations of the group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO, 17/05/2010, *ibid*, p. 11 & 44.

⁴⁷ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Annex II.

⁴⁸ **Ministère de la défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/livre_blanc_tome1_partiel.pdf> [accessed 04/08/2008], p.110.

⁴⁹ **Ministère de la défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, *ibid*, p.121. French nuclear patrimony comprehends less than 300 nuclear warheads. The long-range launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the M51, developed in 1995 to reach distant countries, and the new shorter-range-launched cruise missile, the ASMPA (Air-Sol Moyenne Portée, Amélioré) will continue to be the cornerstone of French deterrence

Ministère de la défense, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, *ibid*, p.170. France developed a new airborne nuclear warhead (TNA), which will equip the ASMPA missile on the Mirage 2000, Rafale and NK3 aircrafts.

⁵⁰ **Plantey** Alain, 2008, *La négociation de Louis XIV au Général de Gaulle*, in **Pekar Lempereur A., Colson A.**, *Négociations européennes d'Henri IV à l'Europe des 27*, Paris : AC2 Medias, p.165.

⁵¹ **Bétermier** Jean, 2009, *How to link deterrence theory to strategic planning*, in **Kamp** Karl-Heinz, *ibid*, p.175.

⁵² NATO, 2009, *Declaration on Alliance Security, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009*, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm> [accessed 18/08/2010].

proportions of the mix of capabilities are subject to interpretation.

According to Yost, “expert observers from non-nuclear-weapon-state European allied nations have historically expressed several reservations regarding French proposals for an EU dialogue on nuclear deterrence.”⁵³ Some invoke the inadequacy of French nuclear patrimony to deter any threat, considering it only as a complement of the US deterrence. Others, such as Germany or Italy, do not wish to increase France’s political status, which would reduce their own political status. Anyway, France is not showing any willingness to accept nuclear deterrence commitment for ESDP or NATO.⁵⁴

To conclude, while President Obama proclaimed US willingness for a nuclear free world, the 2010 US deterrence policy still relies mainly on Nuclear force, also keeping NATO Allies content, as the presence of US WMDs in Europe maintain a political and unifying role. Although a convergence of French and US views could emerge toward the US Nuclear presence in Europe, a consensus on the NATO ballistic missile defence program will be more difficult to reach because of its financial implications and the divergent conceptual approach between both countries.

1.3 **The power projection of France and the USA**

Today, the USA has one of the largest armies in the world⁵⁵ and represents around 45% of

⁵³ **Yost** David S., 2009, *Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 85, No. 4, Jul., 2009, pp. 755-780, p.762.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ **Cordesman, Kleber**, 2006, *Overview of Major Asian Powers*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 26/06/2006, Available at: http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/060626_asia_balance_powers.pdf > [accessed 30/08/2010], p.25. China has more than 7.000 000 soldiers (2.255 000 are regular soldiers) against 1 420 000 for the United States.

US Department of Defense, 2010, *United States Armed Forces*, Available at: <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/ms0.pdf> > [accessed 30/08/2010].

global military expenditure (growing steadily).⁵⁶ Like his predecessor, President Obama wants to maintain the US military superiority and “underpin global security.”⁵⁷ The USA is today militarily present in 50 different countries (but not in France), having in total 716 overseas military bases, mainly in Germany (182 bases), Japan (88), South Korea (62), Italy (42), and United Kingdom (25).⁵⁸ In opposition to the Bush administration, which privileged ad hoc coalitions and the massive use of military force, Obama’s strategy calls for “new partnerships with emerging centers of influence” and a “push for institutions that are more capable of responding to the challenges of our times.”⁵⁹ The main goals of this new strategy are: defeating Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan; to fight against nuclear weapons proliferation; to end responsibly the war in Iraq; to promote peace and security in Israel and the Middle East and to ensure energy security.⁶⁰

Regarding the geopolitical orientation of US foreign policy, for some scholars the USA is rotating its attention toward the East and Far East.⁶¹ “Europe is the object of benign U.S. neglect,” said Camille Grand.⁶² As the Cold War is finished, the USA does not have an interest in keeping a large military presence in Europe and the “burden-sharing problem” is now on

⁵⁶ **Shah** Anup, 2010, *Global Military Spending*, Global Issues, 07/07/2010, Available at: <<http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending>> [accessed 31/08/2010].

⁵⁷ **Sanger** David E., **Baker** Peter, 2010, *New U.S. Strategy Focuses on Managing Threats*, New York Times, 27/05/2010, Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/world/28strategy.html>> (accessed 17/08/2010).

⁵⁸ **US Department of State**, 2009, *Base Structure Report FY 2009*, <<http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2009baseline.pdf>> [accessed 30/08/2010], p.7.

⁵⁹ **DeYoung** Karen, 2010, *President Obama's national security strategy looks beyond military might*, Washington Post, 27/05/2010, Available at: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052604234.html>> [accessed 18/08/2010].

⁶⁰ **The White House Website**, 2010, *Foreign Policy*, Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy> [accessed 17/08/2010].

⁶¹ **Carré** Bruno L.G, 2010, *Perception et impact au Royaume Uni de la politique de défense française*, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Paris: La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.176.

⁶² **Cohen** Roger, 2010, *Europe and Benign Neglect*, The New York Times, 06/09/2010, Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/opinion/07iht-edcohen.html>> [accessed 09/09/2010].

the table for negotiation.⁶³ For example, the Obama administration cancelled the Bush Administration's plans (a radar system in the Czech Republic and ground based interceptors in Poland), opting for the negotiation with NATO allies of other defence programs within the framework of the new NATO strategic concept (then not only with bilateral agreements).⁶⁴ The Middle East will continue to be of great importance for the US, for the cooperation with Israel, the transformation of Iranian's nuclear policy, the access to energy, and for counterterrorism operations.⁶⁵ In the view of Holbrooke, "at the heart of the US geostrategic challenge lie five countries with linked borders: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan."⁶⁶ That is why Turkey has a very important role in the US strategy for the stabilization of the region (Cf part 3.3). In Iraq, all the US troops will be removed by the end of 2011.⁶⁷ Washington plans to reduce its troops in Afghanistan, in accordance with the conditions on the ground, transferring responsibilities to Afghan security forces.⁶⁸

A US tactical redeployment in Africa, mainly to fight against terrorist Islam, is being envisaged, but not without difficulties. The USA still did not find any country to host the USA Africa Command (Africom)'s Headquarter, which is based temporarily in Stuttgart (Germany). One of the main reasons for the failed Africom implementation could be the practice of mixing of civilian, diplomatic and military instruments which tend to militarize the US foreign policy.⁶⁹ As security challenges are larger than the privileged areas France

⁶³ **Reichard** Martin, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A legal and Political Perspective*, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006, p.5.

⁶⁴ **Agence France Presse**, 30/07/2010, Available at: <<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4730253>> [accessed 31/08/2010]. The article mentioned the scrap of a missile shield project by the Obama's administration in September 2009, as well as the evocation by the Czech Prime Minister Petr Necas to create a "missile warning center funded by the United States and incorporated into a NATO missile defense system."

⁶⁵ **US Department of State**, 2010, *The National Security Strategy*, US White Paper on Security, May 2010, Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf> [accessed 08/09/2010], p.24.

⁶⁶ **Holbrooke** Richard, 2008, *The next President. Mastering a Daunting Agenda*, in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2008, p.2-24, p.15.

⁶⁷ *ibid*, p.25.

⁶⁸ *ibid*, p.21.

⁶⁹ **Ploch** Lauren, 2010, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, April 2010, Available at: <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf>> [accessed 11/08/2010], p.6.

manages in Africa, the creation of Africom could be perceived as an opportunity by France, not necessarily as competition.⁷⁰

USA still considers that Al Qaida is the most dangerous component of the larger terrorist network, having its epicenter in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁷¹ However, it is far from being clear if the war in Afghanistan is mainly a counterinsurgency operation (as argued by General Petraus),⁷² a mainly anti-terrorist operation (sustained by Joe Biden⁷³) or a stabilization and reconstruction mission, as France perceives it.⁷⁴ Those divergent visions could have consequences on an agreed strategy. For example, the USA wants to use the NATO Response Force (NRF) in Afghan military operations, a proposal which must face the reluctance of France.⁷⁵ In fact, France is much less enthusiastic about this war than the USA, being more hesitant to commit resources.⁷⁶ However, France tries to get closer to Washington, sending more troops to Afghanistan, following the American line on Iran and even visiting Baghdad (B. Kouchner in August 2007 and N. Sarkozy in February 2009).⁷⁷

France tries to orientate its military and security efforts toward the Mediterranean Sea,

⁷⁰ Lieutenant-colonel **Charpy** Emmanuel, 2010, *Interview of Lieutenant-colonel Emmanuel Charpy, NATO Policy Adviser*. Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 08/09/2010. Annex III.

⁷¹ **Ploch** Lauren, 2010, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, ibid, p.20.

⁷² **Petraus** David H., **Mattis** James N., 2006, *Counterinsurgency, (Final Draft—Not for Implementation)*, 15/12/2006, Available at: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf>> (accessed 02/09/2010).

⁷³ **Page** Susan, **Michaels** Jim, 2009, *Poll finds skepticism on Afghanistan democracy*, USA Today, 10/08/2009, Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-10-07-afghanistan-poll_N.htm> (accessed 02/09/2010).

⁷⁴ **Morelli** Vincent, **Belkin** Paul, 2009, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 03/12/2009, Available at: <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf>> [Accessed: 03/09/2010], p.28.

⁷⁵ **Noetzel** Timo, **Schreer** Benjamin, 2009, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, *International Affairs* 85: 2, p.218. However, the NATO Response Forces has been involved in Afghan presidential elections in September 2004, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm> [accessed 01/09/2010]

⁷⁶ **Bocquet M.**, **Müller G.**, **Brandeck**, 2009, *France's New NATO Policy: Leveraging a Realignment of the Alliance?*, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2009, Available at: <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/bocquet.pdf>> [accessed 02/09/2010], p.105

⁷⁷ **Charillon** Frédéric, 2010, *France and the US: from reluctant alliance to ambiguous rapprochement*, *European Political Science*, Palgrave Mac Millan: Basingtoke, Volume 9, June 2010, p.193.

the Horn of Africa, The Gulf States and South Asia.⁷⁸ France also wants to convert the actual defence and military cooperation agreements to evolve toward a partnership between Europe and Africa.⁷⁹ However, since 2002, whereas the USA increases its defence expenditures more quickly than the rise of their Gross Domestic Product⁸⁰ (the 2010 estimated budget in 2010 is 719,179 millions US\$ against 616 073 millions US\$ for 2009⁸¹), France is going to reduce its defence expenses from 2.3% of the French GDP in 2008 (36.8 billions of Euros) to 2% of its GDP in 2020.⁸² The number of US Professional Army soldiers was maintained at more than 500,000 in 2009,⁸³ whereas France reduces the number of Land and Air forces' units, while modernizing its components. France will dispose of 131 000 Land soldiers, 44 000 Marine Units and 50 000 Air units in 2014-2015 (220 000 units), against a total of 271 000 units today.⁸⁴

France has also established a new naval base (with an air component) in the emirate of Abu Dhabi, to counter a potential attack coming from Iran. This new permanent base is a revolution in the French military strategy, as France only tried to live on its colonial inheritance, never constructing any new military bases in 50 years and disposing of permanent military bases abroad only in Africa. In the view of Facon, the French security agreement with Abu Dhabi could increase the regional military conflict with Iran.⁸⁵ In fact, the base is located

⁷⁸ Carré Bruno L.G, 2009, *ibid*, p.178.

⁷⁹ **Ministère de la défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/livre_blanc_1337/livre_blanc_1340/index.html> [accessed 04/08/2010], p.315.

⁸⁰ **Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale**, Paris, June 2008, *ibid*, p.28.

⁸¹ **U.S Bureau**, 2010, *Federal Government Outlays by Function and Subfunction: 1962–2015 Fiscal Year 2011 (Table 3.2)*, Available at: <<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/sheets/hist03z2.xls>> [accessed 04/08/2010].

⁸² **Ministère de la défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, *ibid*, p.195.

⁸³ **Federation of American Scientists**, Available at: <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/2009dodbud.pdf>> [accessed 04/08/2010], p.37.

⁸⁴ **Ministère de la défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/livre_blanc_tome1_partie2.pdf> [accessed 02/09/2010], p.228.

⁸⁵ **Facon Isabelle**, 2009, *Great Power Deterrence relationships: Russia, The United States and Europe*, in Karl-Heinz Kamp, 2009, *NATO and 21st Century Deterrence*, *ibid*, p.116.

at only 225km from Iran. It is through the Strait of Ormuz, near Abu Dhabi, that transit 20% of all oil shipments worldwide.⁸⁶ In Philippe Alfroy's view, this new military base is a way for France to increase its strategic role in the region, and to obtain “lucrative defence contracts and nuclear energy deals.”⁸⁷ Accordingly, France is directly competing with the USA for the region's arms market, while following the USA strategic military plans.

To conclude, besides the Middle East and in particular Iran, which is a common threat for both countries, there is a different geographical orientation between France and United States, with France oriented toward Europe and Africa, whereas USA is orientated towards Asia. Their military means are also different as the USA is increasing the military budget while France diminishes it. Certainly, those different military strategies will have an influence on their attitude toward ESDP and NATO.

Chapter 2. The peace building role of NATO and ESDP

2.1 The American and French perception of the ESDP

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been established mainly with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, developing peacekeeping, crisis management and peace-making capacities known as “Petersberg tasks.”⁸⁸ However, EU members have difficulty achieving a common vision of what should be the role of ESDP on the world stage. In other words the “perception of weakness and divisiveness given by the EU members” concerning

⁸⁶ **U.S Energy Information Administration**, 2010, *World Oil Transit Chokepoints*, Available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html> [accessed 20/08/2010].

⁸⁷ **Alfroy** Philippe, 2009, *Sarkozy in Abu Dhabi to open Gulf base for France*, , Agence France Presse, 25/05/2009, Available at: <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jZxh3GhaqMTkCLi3AX14yPsoBU_A> [accessed 01/09/2010].

⁸⁸ **Europa Glossary**, 2010, Available at: <http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_policy_en.htm> [accessed 03/09/2010].

international issues, “can encourage the USA to look for bilateral support for its external policies,” instead of ESDP.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, according to Jamie Shea, the USA is looking toward the strengthening of the EU ESDP.⁹⁰ In fact, the White House is under pressure with the financial crisis, with the world's pressure over Afghanistan, and consequently they are more pragmatic than before. It means that the priority today for the USA is the providing of resources for security issues; it does not matter if it is through NATO or through ESDP. According to Salmon, the USA agreed to abandon the strict “Albright 3D principles (no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination between NATO and ESDP)” already at the 1999 NATO summit, acknowledging the EU would avoid only “unnecessary” duplication of military resources (a meaning open to interpretation).⁹¹ Yet, the EU is dependent on US military assets for any large military operation, which enables the USA to keep a form of control over EU operations.⁹²

The development of European defence policy has been the spearhead of Sarkozy’s security plan.⁹³ Paris believes NATO and the EU are complementary organizations in the field of international security.⁹⁴ In Sarkozy’s vision, NATO has the aim of collective defence of its members (with then a restricted vision on the application of article 5 to military defence), whereas the EU would have a much larger political and military mission,⁹⁵ already having much experience in civil-military operations.⁹⁶ President Sarkozy estimates that the priority

⁸⁹ **Dukes** Simon, 2008, The future of EU-NATO Relations : a case of mutual irrelevance through competition, [Journal of European Integration](#), Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2008, p.36.

⁹⁰ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Annex II.

⁹¹ **Salmon** T.C, **Shepherd** A. J. K., 2003, *Toward a European: a military power in the making?*, Lynne Rienner Publishers: London, 2003, p.165.

⁹² **Reichard** Martin, 2006, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A legal and Political Perspective*, Ashgate: Aldershot, p.37.

⁹³ **Ministère de la défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, *ibid*, p.84, 88.

⁹⁴ *ibid*, p.99.

⁹⁵ *ibid*, p.101.

⁹⁶ **Cercle des Européens**, 2009, *Europe de la défense : les relations entre l’OTAN et la PESD*, 24/09/2009, Available at: <<http://www.ceuropeens.org/Europe-de-la-defense-les-relations-entre-l-OTAN-et-la-PESD.html>>(accessed 07/08/2010).

must be given to the management crisis capacity of the EU, having the ambition to create a force of 60 000 soldiers, in order to be able to comply with 2 or 3 simultaneous peace building operations in different places.⁹⁷ He considers as necessary the creation of a European white paper on defence and security. The Albright principles of no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination are today considered as “real potential outcomes.”⁹⁸ For example, following the Georgian crisis, ESDP has particularly demonstrated its utility, deploying a civil mission which would not have been possible for NATO, for political reasons⁹⁹ or because “European interventions can claim to be more neutral and less warlike than NATO ones.”¹⁰⁰

As Simon Dukes points out, the development of ESDP is a way of “furthering what are seen as shared European values and principles (or more simply, to differentiate from those US practices that cause worry amongst some Europeans allies)”.¹⁰¹ In other words, with ESDP, EU countries will no longer have to be dependent upon US domestic and foreign policy, being able to promote their interests in international affairs. For example, in 2003 ESDP forces were capable of intervening in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis), whereas the USA was not enthusiastic about the idea of intervention through NATO.¹⁰² However, it seems that there is always “a dialectical relationship” with EU states between “the national instinct and the perceived need for solidarity.”¹⁰³ In Irondelle's view, even if France kept promoting the ESDP and strengthened Europe since the end of the Cold War, the Gaullist legacy, having for its cornerstone a strategic independence, impedes a

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ **Howorth** Jolyon, 2003, *ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?*, Cooperation and Conflict, 38: 235, p.252.

⁹⁹ **Pflimlin** Edouard, 2009, *OTAN et PESD : concurrentes ou complémentaires ?*, Le Monde, 02.04.09.

¹⁰⁰ **D'Argenson** Pierre Henri, 2009, *The Future of European Defence Policy*, Survival, vol. 51 no.5, October-November 2009, p.145. For D'Argenson, ESDP is more neutral because NATO is associated “with American interests by countries which see NATO as a US political and military instrument.”

¹⁰¹ **Dukes** Simon, 2008, *The future of EU-NATO Relations : a case of mutual irrelevance through competition*, Journal of European Integration, Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2008, p.33.

¹⁰² Ibid, p.23.

¹⁰³ **Hill**, C., 2004, *Renationalizing or regrouping? Eu foreign policy since 11 Spetember 2001*. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(1), p.160.

French dedication to strong European institutions.¹⁰⁴ France argues for an intergovernmental logic of political union, whereas other EU members, such as, Germany, sustain an ESDP leaded by the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Even if Europe is not a major military actor or a strategic axis anymore, for the USA it is the “most natural partner for security cooperation,” sharing Western liberal values and ready to cooperate for many challenges.¹⁰⁵ However, for Reichard, the limited military capacity of the EU and its lack of desire to get involved in military operations alienate transatlantic relations.¹⁰⁶ USA is then in favour of more EU capabilities. The EU states’ complaint about the USA opposing the development of a strong European defence, considering ESDP as a threat for the survival of NATO, is not valid anymore. EU States flagrant lack of will and commitment toward ESDP is now highlighted, considering the slow tempo of its development.

To conclude, ESDP is welcomed by the USA as a new peace building European institution, a possibility to increase financial and military resources to underpin global security, but a waste of money and authority when there is a duplication of NATO activities. For France, it is a way to increase its military and political status as well as to defend better EU interests. However, its role and powers are still not well established within European countries. Consequently, NATO remains the main collective defence organization.

2.2 The different views over the role of NATO

¹⁰⁴ **Ironnelle** Bastien, 2009, *European Foreign Policy: The end of French Europe?*, in **Jones** Erik, **Van Genugten** Sakia, 2009, *The future of European foreign policy*, Routledge: New York, p.151.

¹⁰⁵ **Charillon** Frédéric, 2010, *ibid*, p.195.

¹⁰⁶ **Reichard** Martin, 2006, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A legal and Political Perspective*, Ashgate: Aldershot, p.43

In the last 20 years, NATO has known more transformation than in its whole existence, doubling the number of NATO members, changing twice the strategic concept, enlarging its zone of intervention, transforming its command organization, creating an entirely new intervention force (NRF), participating in 3 wars (Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan) and conducting various civil operations.¹⁰⁷ All these transformations have created an increasing complexity and uncertainty regarding the future of NATO, if we consider the dynamic of the “multi-tiers alliance” which has emerged.¹⁰⁸ In Noetzel's view, the different blocs can be divided into the reformists' members (asking for NATO expansion), the status quo countries and the reversal ones (which want to reduce NATO scope), France and USA having opposing views on NATO transformations.¹⁰⁹

In Frédéric Bozo's view, France is first concerned by “an excessive globalization” of NATO and a structure dominated by the USA as it was during the Cold War.¹¹⁰ Then, France tends to see NATO more in its traditional role, a collective defence in Europe, considering the Afghan war as an exception, not the rule which creates a precedent.¹¹¹ Conversely, the USA could consider NATO as a mere power projection. In the view of Charles Cogan, Washington now prefers multilateral commitment rather than unilateral wars, especially after the tragedy of the Iraq war. NATO is then a way to legitimize its policies towards the international community and to share defence expenses, as well as to justify its presence in Europe.¹¹² The experts' report advocates an extension of NATO's role, but remains sufficiently unclear as to

¹⁰⁷ **Lellouche** Pierre, 2009, *L'allié indocile: La France et l'OTAN, de la Guerre froide à l'Afghanistan*, Editions du Moment: Paris, p.167.

¹⁰⁸ **Noetzel** Timo, **Schreer** Benjamin, 2009, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, *International Affairs*, 85: 2, 2009, p.215.

¹⁰⁹ Cf Annex I.

¹¹⁰ **Bozo** Frédéric, 2010, *Sarkozy's NATO policy : towards France's atlantic realignment ?*, *European Political Science*, *ibid*, p.180.

¹¹¹ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Annex II.

¹¹² **Howorth** Jolyon, 2006, *ibid*, p.236.

be interpreted differently by NATO members.¹¹³ Bruno Racine, expert in Albright's group, stated that by "realism," experts did not recommend NATO to develop civil capacities, but preferably opt for an interaction between the EU and UN.¹¹⁴

According to Jamie Shea, today France and USA have a sort of commonality on the wanted transformation of NATO. Both want it more efficient, reducing the command structure, getting rid of redundant NATO agencies.¹¹⁵ In particular, the decision making will have to be reformed. As Hamilton explains, the unanimity rule is a custom developed during the 1990s within the NAC (North Atlantic Council, to which France always belonged), which has normally to be applied to decide the carrying of major decisions about core strategic concepts. To avoid paralysis, some mechanisms exist, such as the shift of decisions to the DFC (Defence Planning Committee). Yet, with the return of France in the DFC and new member countries within the Alliance, this will not be possible anymore (as France and Germany will have facilities to recruit dissenters).¹¹⁶ Mechanisms of "variable geometry" will have to be introduced, with some members contributing more than others, while avoiding the unanimity rule.¹¹⁷

For France, the new role of NATO is worrying, because of the bad management of the NATO financial resources, as exemplified by the 640€ million debt for the NATO budget

¹¹³ **Albright** Madeleine K, 2010, *ibid*, p.33: "NATO is a regional, not a global organisation; its financial resources are limited and subject to other priorities; and it has no desire to take on missions that other institutions and countries can be counted upon to handle." But p.38, it is stated that "In the coming decade, NATO will have four central interrelated military missions [...] deploy[ing] and sustain[ing] expeditionary capabilities for military operations beyond the treaty area."

¹¹⁴ **Nougayrède** Natalie, **Stroobants** Jean-Pierre, 2010, *L'OTAN veut s'adapter aux "menaces diffuses" d'un monde globalisé*, Le Monde, 18/05/2010.

¹¹⁵ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Annex II.

¹¹⁶ **Hamilton** Daniel S., 2004, *Transatlantic Transformations: equipping NATO for the 21st Century*, Washington D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations, p.66.

¹¹⁷ **Noetzel** Timo, **Schreer** Benjamin, 2009, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, *International Affairs*, 85: 2, p.224.

2010, most of it caused by the Afghan war.¹¹⁸ According to Jamie Shea, France invokes a lack of transparency, having not been aware in time of NATO's financial situation, and is pushing for an overall reform to improve financial procedures and prevent future insolvencies. France negotiates the sale of the debt in exchange for a financial reform, in order to reduce or maintain an identical budget, whereas the Americans are in favour of increasing the NATO budget.¹¹⁹ Yet, at the June 2010 NATO ministerial meeting, both countries agreed on the necessity to reduce the size and number of the headquarters and the integrated military structure by three quarters, reducing the expenses of 1.5\$ billions.¹²⁰ However, as France is also involved in the Afghan war, I presume that France is pragmatic and awaits the end of the conflict before pushing for any financial reform.

The reintegration of France within NATO at the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO summit on 4th April 2009 announced an "appeasement", a new closer Franco-American relationship.¹²¹ Besides the announcement effect, French collaboration within NATO is not new, as France participated to the different NATO deployments since 1995 (IFOR and SFOR from 1995 to 2004; Kosovo since 1999, Afghanistan since 2006). In 2004-2005, France was even the top NATO contributor, above the USA and United Kingdom (strongly involved in the Iraq war).¹²² For Lellouche, there has been a diplomatic hypocrisy during 4 decades, between official discourses towards public opinion to proclaim France's independence, and the real but more secret partnership between France and the other NATO members within this institution, to

¹¹⁸ **Guibert** Nathalie, **Stroobants** Jean-Pierre, 2010, *Minée par une grave crise budgétaire, l'OTAN réfléchit à sa réforme*, Le Monde, 11/06/2010.

¹¹⁹ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Annex II.

¹²⁰ **Maulny** Jean Pierre, 2010, *New NATO Strategic Concept: a view from France*, Fridriech Ebert Stiftung: Berlin, August 2010, Available at: <<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07409.pdf>>(accessed 20/08/2010), p.5.

¹²¹ **Keiger** J.F.V., 2010, *The "novelty" of sarkozy's foreign policy towards NATO and the US: the long view*, European Political Science, *ibid*, p.155.

¹²² **Lellouche** Pierre, 2009, *L'allié indocile: La France et l'OTAN, de la Guerre froide à l'Afghanistan*, Editions du Moment: Paris, 2009, p.239.

defend French national interests.¹²³

The French return into NATO was a tactical move: it is easier to Europeanize NATO and to promote ESDP being within NATO's decision board than standing apart.¹²⁴ Paris negotiated 2 important chairs: the command of Lisbon, which has charge of the NATO Response Force, and the allied-command of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) military command in Norfolk (USA). The ACT is very strategic as it prepares the eventual reforms of NATO.¹²⁵ French General Stéphane Abrial was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Transformation on 9th September 2009,¹²⁶ reducing the US predominance over NATO (even if USA still controls the Supreme Allied Commander Europe), while increasing France's political role. However, France will not invest so much in a structure which entails drawbacks: the supplying of numerous officers could be at the expense of other national or European structures; the return to NATO represents a consistent cost for a decreasing budget;¹²⁷ the image of an administration not in line with past policies could be considered as less reliable by other countries.¹²⁸ Thus the reintegration will be *a minima*, a political move rather than a military one, a simple "normalization" of the French integration into NATO.

The NATO's presence in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour) is still a

¹²³ Ibid, p.238.

¹²⁴ **Cogan** Charles, 2010, *Washington, Sarkozy, and the defense of Europe*, European Political Science, *ibid*, p.171.

¹²⁵ **Maulny** J.P., 2010, *Nicolas Sarkozy et la politique de défense de la France*, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, *ibid*, p.110.

¹²⁶ **North Atlantic Treaty Organization Newroom**, 2009, *Change of command at Allied Command Transformation*, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-687E11CF-DD185239/natolive/news_57470.htm?selectedLocale=en> [accessed 06/09/2010].

¹²⁷ **Le Sénat**, Rapport législatif du Sénat, *Projet de loi de finances pour 2010 : Défense - Préparation et emploi des forces*, Available at: <<http://www.senat.fr/rap/a09-102-6/a09-102-67.html>> (accessed 06/09/2010). The annual cost for the reintegration of NATO will be 100€ million.

¹²⁸ **Bozo** Frédéric, 2008, *France and NATO under Sarkozy: end of the French exception?*, Working Paper, Fondation pour l'innovation politique:Paris, March 2008, p.14. However, in an interview for Le Monde, Bozo stated that the return of France within NATO could reassure European partners, demonstrating that France is not aiming at constructing a European defense against NATO or against the USA (Le Monde, *Otan: la "réintégration n'indique pas en soi un alignement sur les Etats-Unis,"* 12.03.09.).

consequence of the fight against terrorism which began in 2001.¹²⁹ Now, the USA is willing to use NATO for large military operations. Until 2003, it is true that the Afghanistan implication of NATO concerned only peacekeeping operations, whereas the “enforcement operations” were conducted by the USA forces.¹³⁰ However, especially since the UN Resolution 1510 from the 13th October 2003¹³¹, the UNSC favored a NATO accountability and the command of the ISAF forces on all Afghan territory. Washington favors a wide interpretation of NAT Article 5, performing tasks not only for homeland defence, meeting security challenges “wherever they may come.”¹³² In other words, the USA “has pushed for a global NATO not only in geographical terms but in functional terms also.”¹³³

There is no doubt that the USA would like to go further, with NATO having a higher profile, especially for energy security and to fight the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC). It means that the USA wishes reforms serving its “grand strategic considerations.”¹³⁴ France prefers to maintain the status quo, not only because of its desire to strengthen ESDP, but also because of its fear of alienating major powers such as China and Russia.¹³⁵ But as we mentioned earlier, the financial crisis, the actual problems the USA encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Obama’s intent to improve the image of America in the world, will render USA more ready to accommodate the more modest French requirements for NATO. However, according to a US official, the USA will succeed in imposing a missile defense agreement, already under negotiation, which will be announced at

¹²⁹ NATO, 2010, *Opération Active Endeavour*, Available at:

http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index-f.html > [accessed 10/09/2010].

¹³⁰ Medcalf J., 2002, NATO and the Extra-European Challenge, p.235, cited in Reichard Martin, *ibid*, p.116.

¹³¹ UN Resolution 1510, 13/10/2003, Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N03555555.pdf?OpenElement> > [accessed 18/08/2010].

¹³² NATO, 2002, *Prague Summit Declaration*, 21 November 2002, paragraph 3, Available at:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> > [accessed 08/08/2010].

¹³³ Bozo Frédéric, 2010, Sarkozy’s NATO policy: towards France’s atlantic realignment ?, *ibid*, p.186.

¹³⁴ Noetzel Timo, Schreer Benjamin, 2009, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, International Affairs 85: 2, p.216.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*.

the next Lisbon Summit.¹³⁶

Regarding NATO enlargement, the US proposal to reform the partnership system in order to create a global alliance (with Japan, Brazil, Australia,...) has already been refused at the 2006 Riga Summit, notably by France and Germany.¹³⁷ Regarding Georgia and Ukraine, Paris and Washington agree that Georgia and Ukraine should not join NATO for the moment, following Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008.¹³⁸ However, the reasons of these common positions are different. For the USA, it was "fuelled by NATO's inability to offer Georgia and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest summit in April 2008." In fact, in the US view, NATO is a tool to "strengthening liberal democracies that are potentially under threat."¹³⁹ For France (as for other "status quo members"), NATO enlargement must be a way to strengthen the internal stability of the European continent. Then, it is the inability of both countries to meet the membership criteria and face their domestic insecurity (as Abkhazia and Ossetia) which prevent them from joining NATO, as it would have weakened NATO (projecting instability) and its relationship with Russia.¹⁴⁰ The new Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, renounced to join NATO the 27th May 2010.¹⁴¹ For the USA, the next country to join NATO would be Macedonia.¹⁴²

Concerning the Partnership network of NATO (Partnership for Peace, the Istanbul

¹³⁶ **US official at NATO**, 2010, Interview of a US Official at NATO, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 09/09/2010. Appendix IV.

¹³⁷ **Pflimlin** Edouard, 2009, *S'étirer géographiquement sans provoquer la Russie*, Le Monde, 02.04.09.

¹³⁸ **Charillon** Frédéric, 2010, *France and the US: from reluctant alliance to ambiguous rapprochement*, ibid, p.196.

¹³⁹ **Noetzel** Timo, **Schreer** Benjamin, 2009, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, *International Affairs* 85: 2, p.217. The former NATO enlargements (the last one being the 1st April 2009 to 28 Members, including Albania and Croatia) had especially a political incentive, including old socialist democracies into Western Europe, promising stability and peace. The military aspect was secondary as these countries did not bring large military components.

¹⁴⁰ **Noetzel** Timo, **Schreer** Benjamin, *Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change*, *International Affairs* 85: 2, 2009, p.217.

¹⁴¹ **Le Monde**, 30/05/2010.

¹⁴² **US official at NATO**, 2010, Interview of a US Official at NATO, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 09/09/2010. Appendix IV.

Cooperation Initiative, the Mediterranean Dialogue), France acknowledged the shifting of the centre of gravity for strategic matters toward Asia, but is scared of a dilution of its objectives and a dispersion of NATO budget.¹⁴³ Moreover, France wants to keep these partnerships in a European and Mediterranean context, that is to say the boundaries of Europe. Since 1994, NATO developed the Mediterranean Dialogue, a framework of security and cooperation agreement with Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania) and the Middle East (Egypt, Israel and Jordan). There is then also complementarities with the Mediterranean Union, an economic and political institution created under the auspice of the Sarkozy presidency, gathering approximately the same countries (the same ones plus others, being composed of 44 countries). The Americans push for more partnerships with Asia, Indonesia, China, the emerging powers. The French view, is the risk of the globalisation of NATO. Hubert Vedrine used to say that NATO is the Organisation of the North Atlantic and not the Organization of the Pacific North.¹⁴⁴ Even if Vedrine is not the French Foreign Minister anymore, it is always this mentality that continues to prevail in Paris.¹⁴⁵

To conclude, France and the USA both consider NATO as a tool to further their political and strategic objectives. Then, France, having a less ambitious foreign policy, pushes for a limited role of NATO, with a light structure focusing on European interests and nearby territory, whereas the USA negotiates a deepening of NATO missions, in line with their leading position in the world.

2.3 The ESDP and NATO relationship

¹⁴³ **Ministère de la Défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, *ibid*, p.105.

¹⁴⁴ **Speech of Védrine Hubert**, 1998, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interdepartmental meeting at the NATO summit, 06/12/1998, Available at: <<http://lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr/pdf/993000016.pdf>> [accessed 18/08/2010].

¹⁴⁵ **Shea Jamie**, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Appendix II.

As Giegerich points out, “the worldwide demand for mission continues to grow rapidly”.¹⁴⁶ In 2007, the whole peacekeeping operation around the world necessitated around 160,000 troops, from which 63,000 were EU member-states troops, that is to say 4% of the total active forces in the Union.¹⁴⁷ The ESDP is actually involved in 24 missions around the globe,¹⁴⁸ becoming a “sui generis type of civilian-military crisis management entrepreneur”.¹⁴⁹ In Afghanistan, “NATO capacities are increasingly absorbed by the ongoing operations, given the daily problems and the fact that, particularly in Afghanistan (Strasbourg/Kehl: “our key priority”), its credibility appears to be on the line.”¹⁵⁰ The ESDP has shown its abilities also in Afghanistan, with the approval by the United Nations Security Council of the Crisis Management Concept in the field of policing, which increased the EU-UN cooperation.¹⁵¹ Nonetheless, for Gheciu, some counter-terrorists operations performed by NATO forces would not have been materially possible for the ESDP at this stage of its development.¹⁵²

Both institutions, NATO and the ESDP, have adopted a civilian-military approach to the pursuit of security. According to Jamie Shea, Americans argue that NATO must have more civilian planning capabilities, civilians experts, while the French consider this possibility as a duplication of the EU or the UN, believing NATO is first of all a military alliance, having for vocation military matters and therefore they don't like the American emphasis on giving NATO more civilian functions.¹⁵³ Both organizations sustain liberal norms, “defeating those

¹⁴⁶ **Giegerich** Bastian, 2008, *European Military Crisis Management: Connecting ambition and Reality*, Paris: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper N°397, Routledge: Oxon, October 2008, p.7.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p.8.

¹⁴⁸ **The European Union**, 2010, *EU Operations*, Council of the EU, Available at: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>> [accessed 11/08/2010].

¹⁴⁹ **Howorth** Jolyon, 2003, *ESDP and NATO : Wedlock or Deadlock?*, Cooperation and Conflict, 38: 235, p.209

¹⁵⁰ **Wittman** Klaus, *Towards a new Strategic Concept for NATO*, NATO Defense College: NDC Forum Paper 10, Roma, September 2009, p.55.

¹⁵¹ **Gheciu** Alexandra, *Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post -9/11*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p.54.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p.27.

¹⁵³ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume

who allegedly refuse to subject themselves to the principles of liberal rationality.”¹⁵⁴ Their cooperation has been very successful for the fight against terrorism, “helping NATO to adapt to the new security environment.”¹⁵⁵ However, NATO and the EU remain very different in regards to their resources, memberships and configuration, which influence also different interests and mandates. As I already mentioned, the political dimension of the EU’s security forces complicates a clear definition of its goals on the international scene and slow down its development.

Each institution has given emphasis to its personal cultural and material assets, in order to define itself and improve its position. The ESDP has shown its abilities in fighting terrorism, relying more on socio-economic and political aspects than military ones. In fact, its response to the 09/11 attacks were mostly embedded in the third pillar of the EU, the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters Pillar, which emphasizes legal and police intergovernmental cooperation.¹⁵⁶ NATO can rely on much greater military capabilities, but the EU has other assets and then more potential to evolve and face new kinds of threats.¹⁵⁷ These personal cultural assets also imply, at least as France conceives it, a natural geographical division of the zones of intervention. The EU has always held privileged ties with African countries, thanks to the ex-colonies of France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy or Spain, whereas NATO could work on the great Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁵⁸ That is why most of the EU missions have in the majority, taken place in Africa,

Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Appendix II.

¹⁵⁴ **Gheciu** Alexandra, 2008, *Securing Civilization ? The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post -9/11*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p.85.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p.27.

¹⁵⁶ **Reichard** Martin, 2006, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A legal and Political Perspective*, *ibid*, p.7. But this distinction between NATO and EU is less relevant after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which reorganized the competence of the EU and places all EU competences for defense in the “shared competence” new pillar, into the area of freedom, security and justice. In fact, as it will be noticed in the following paragraph, under the Article 43, the Lisbon Treaty increases largely its means to fight against international terrorism.

¹⁵⁷ **Jones** Erik, **Van Genugten** Sakia, 2009, *The future of European foreign policy*, Routledge: New York, p.2.

¹⁵⁸ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume

whereas NATO until now has managed in Africa only one mission of counter piracy near the coast of Somalia. For Dukes, it is especially the geographical attention which differs between NATO and the ESDP, the EU being more focused on Africa and Asia than NATO. This is due to colonial legacies of the European countries and the special tasks which can be achieved by the ESDP.¹⁵⁹

As it has already been emphasised, for Paris, the strengthening of the ESDP and the renovation of NATO are complementary moves. “The more successful we are in establishing a European defense, the more France will be resolved to resume its full role in NATO”.¹⁶⁰ The Lisbon treaty, signed in December 2007 by EU member states and ratified in 2009, established that the Common Security and Defense Policy “shall include the progressive framing of a defense policy” which “will lead to a common defense,” but respecting and being compatible with “their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”¹⁶¹ The wording is nevertheless ambiguous.

NATO and the ESDP have enhanced a real partnership. First of all, the “Berlin Plus Agreement”¹⁶² established in December 2002, and the Berlin Plus Reverse, institute the exchange of information and enable NATO and the EU to rely on respective military assets to conduct peacekeeping operations. It represents also the recognition of the “decision making autonomy” of the EU.¹⁶³ The development of the 60 000 EU Rapid Reaction Force and the

Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Appendix II.

¹⁵⁹ **Dukes** Simon, 2008, *The future of EU-NATO Relations : a case of mutual irrelevance through competition*, Journal of European Integration, Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2008, p.32.

¹⁶⁰ **Embassy of France in the United States**, 2010, *Speech by President Nicolas Sarkozy before the Congress of the United States of America*. November 7, 2007, Available at: <<http://www.info-france-usa.org/spip.php?article62>> [accessed 03/08/2010].

¹⁶¹ **Consolidated version of the treaty on EU**, Available at: <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF>> [accessed 09/08/2010], Article 42, Para. 1 & 2.

¹⁶² **NATO**, 2006, *Berlin Plus Agreement*, 21/06/2006, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm> [accessed 09/08/2010].

¹⁶³ **Reichard** Martin, 2006, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A legal and Political Perspective*, *ibid*, p.169.

20 000 NATO Response Force can also be considered as a part of their affiliation, as well as the mutual representations in each structure: the “NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.”¹⁶⁴ For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, The EU forces (EUFOR ALTHEA) were deployed in succession to the NATO SFOR mission, and according to the Berlin Plus Agreement, could use NATO planning expertise and capabilities and troop reinforcement from KFOR in Kosovo as well as additional ‘Over the Horizon Forces’.¹⁶⁵ Currently, the EU and NATO are cooperating in Somalia, through the EU operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR) and NATO operation Ocean Shield. In Kosovo, EU and NATO are also complementary through the KFOR mission of NATO and the EULEX mission of the EU.¹⁶⁶

In conclusion, even if the ESDP is still new, NATO and the ESDP have already developed many forms of complementarities, offering more possibilities to intervene in peace building operations. However, Washington maintains the control of the ESDP through its predominance within NATO and the dependency of the ESDP on NATO’s military resources, while the ESDP try to find some autonomy.

¹⁶⁴ NATO Homepage, 2010, *NATO-EU: a strategic partnership*, 10/08/2010, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm > [accessed 09/08/2010].

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ European Security and Defence Assembly, 2009, *Assembly of WEU : Press releases*, 15/09/2009, Available at: <<http://www.assembly-weu.org/fr/presse/cp/2009/35-2009.php> > [accessed 06/09/2010].

Chapter 3. The Partnership Policy of France and the USA

3.1 The Military commitments of France and the USA

The Partnership policy of France and the USA is first of all maintained by the 2 largest diplomatic networks in the world (the USA being first).¹⁶⁷ But both countries are also very active in their sustainment of foreign armies, through financial support or training, and in direct military involvements in foreign territories, as we will now analyze.

According to Xavier Bertrand, General Secretary of the UMP, the peaceful end of the Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the first French concerns.¹⁶⁸ France and the USA critically assess Israel's colonization program,¹⁶⁹ while largely sustaining its military program: in 2010,

¹⁶⁷ **Ministère des Affaires étrangères**, 2010, *évolution du réseau*, Available at: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/ministere_817/modernisation_12824/les-enjeux-les-chantiers_12763/evolution-du-reseau_19452/index.html> [accessed 12/09/2010]; **US Department of State**, 2010, *Websites of U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Diplomatic Missions*, Available at: <<http://www.usembassy.gov/>> [accessed 12/09/2010].

¹⁶⁸ **Bertrand** Xavier, 2010, *Un changement de style, de méthodes et d'objectifs*, **Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques**, La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.75.

¹⁶⁹ **The Associated Press**, 2009, *Netanyahu: No Palestine without demilitarization*, , Haaretz, 24/06/2009 Available at: <<http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-no-palestine-without-demilitarization-1.278718>> [accessed 12/08/2010].

Kessler Glenn, 2009, *Obama Pushes Israel On Settlement Issue*, Washington Post, 29/05/2009, Available at: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803771.html>> [accessed 12/08/2010].

the USA provides \$2.7 billion in security assistance funding, plus training and joint military exercises, arms sales, etc;¹⁷⁰ France, more modestly, is the first European exporter of arms to Israel, accumulating to €126.3 million in 2007,¹⁷¹ while secretly performing military training programs with Israel.¹⁷² There is therefore continuity with previous French and American foreign policies.

According to Behr, France always maintained privileged ties with Arab countries, generally to counter US and Soviet influence “guided by strategic considerations that gave little value to the promotion of democracy.”¹⁷³ However, Nicolas Sarkozy, in a very pragmatic way, is acquainted with many different leaders, without regard for their reputation, demonstrated by the visit of the Libyan dictator Kaddafi in Paris,¹⁷⁴ while making a weapon's deal with him.¹⁷⁵ A policy of dialogue has also been renewed with Syria to reintegrate it in the geopolitical and regional scene, while Washington still considers Damascus as a threat, maintaining economic sanctions.¹⁷⁶ In the meantime, France trains¹⁷⁷ and provides missiles to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), currently under USA disapproval because of the proximity between LAF and

¹⁷⁰ **Shapiro** Andrew J., 2010, *The Obama Administration's Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge*, 16/06/2010, Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/144753.htm>> [accessed 12/09/2010].

¹⁷¹ **Pailhe** Caroline, 2009, Les transferts d'armes de l'Union européenne et de la Belgique vers Israël : Quelle conformité avec le Code de conduite en matière d'exportation d'armements ?, Groupe de Recherche et d'Informations sur la Paix et la Sécurité, 07/01/2009, Available at: <<http://www.grip.org/en/default.asp>> [accessed 12/09/2010], p.5.

¹⁷² **Levy-Antoine** Michel, 2010, *News: sécurité France-Israel - France-Israel's Chamber of Commerce*, 05/06/2010, Available at: <<http://www.israelvalley.com/news/2010/06/05/27700/securite-france-israel-selon-le-canard-enchaine-des-militaires-israeliens-et-francais-ont-participe-dans-les-landes-et-en>> [accessed 12/09/2010].

¹⁷³ **Behr** Timo, 2009, *Enduring Differences? France, Germany and Europe's Middle East Dilemma*, in **Jones** Erik, *ibid*, p.80.

¹⁷⁴ **Rioufol** Ivan, 2008, *La France veut la paix (mais à quel prix?)*, Le Figaro, 18/07/2008.

¹⁷⁵ **BBC**, 03/08/2007, *France and Libya sign arms deal*, Available at: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6928880.stm>> [accessed 11/08/2010].

¹⁷⁶ **Reuters**, 2010, *Barack Obama extends US sanctions against Syria*, guardian.co.uk, 04/05/2010, Available at: <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/04/barack-obama-extends-sanctions-syria>> [accessed 09/09/2010].

¹⁷⁷ **Lebanese Army Website**, 2010, Available at: <<http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/english/navymain.asp>> [accessed 12/09/2010].

Hezbollah¹⁷⁸ (nevertheless, Washington has provided more than \$500 million to LAF since 2006).¹⁷⁹ Washington is developing “key security partnerships in the region with Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries” to develop efficient defense systems.¹⁸⁰

The main French military operations involving the military division are in the Ivory Coast within the framework of the UN (Operation Unicorn), involving 3150 soldiers; in the Balkans, within the ESDP in Bosnia and the UN in Kosovo, involving 2180 units; in Lebanon, with 2460 soldiers, plus 1500 marines along the coast, 880 soldiers in RDC with the UN and the CFDP; in Afghanistan, with 3750 soldiers (the fourth contributor to NATO forces), from Dushambe in Tadjikistan to the Indian ocean.¹⁸¹ France also maintains a presence in Djibouti (2900 soldiers), Gabon (800 soldiers), Senegal (1200), having permanent military bases in Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, Central African Republic and Senegal.¹⁸² Two new bases are planned, in Dakar or Libreville, and Djibouti.¹⁸³ Moreover, France also disposes of an Expeditionary Force in Tchad (called “Epervier”) of 1150 soldiers and 6 Mirage 2000s, deployed in 3 bases (N’Djamena the capital city, Abéché at east and Faya Largeau at North), which enables it to intervene and “supervise” the whole region.¹⁸⁴ Today, the USA has 78 430 US soldiers involved in Afghanistan¹⁸⁵ and has planned to train 140.000 Afghan soldiers within

¹⁷⁸ **Agence France Presse**, 2010, *US lawmaker urges France not to arm Lebanon army*, 27/08/2010, Available at: <<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gkO5yXmI5eHHQxCSNP7-tPXvTGLw>> [accessed 12/09/2010].

¹⁷⁹ **U.S. Department of State**, 2010, *Background Note: Lebanon*, 22/03/2010, Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm>> [accessed 12/09/2010].

¹⁸⁰ US Department of State, 2010, *The National Security Strategy*, US White Paper on Security 2010, May 2010, Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf> [accessed 11/08/2010], p.45.

¹⁸¹ **Ministère des Affaires étrangères**, 2010, Available at: <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations>> [accessed 11/08/2010].

¹⁸² **Hugon Philippe**, 2010, *où en est-on de la Françafrique ?*, Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.166.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ **Canard Jérôme**, 2010, *Sarko « taclé » par son protégé tchadien*, Le Canard Enchaîné, 18/08/2010, p.3.

¹⁸⁵ **International Security Assistance Force**, 2010, *Key Facts and Figures*, 06/08/2010, Available at:

15 months.¹⁸⁶ The USA still has still 49.700 troops in Iraq and has trained more than 50 000 Iraqi soldiers.¹⁸⁷

Africa is one of the last regions where France can claim to be a global power.¹⁸⁸ Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East constitute France's natural geopolitical environment"¹⁸⁹ In parallel, Washington, in its wish to extend the democracies with market economy,¹⁹⁰ has also developed a special partnership with many African countries. In the Sahel, the USA is fighting against terrorism, having invested in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. For example, Mali is involved in 6 different American Military Programs. The African Horn is also a strategic zone for the USA, sheltering since 2002 in Djibouti the only American permanent military base, with 1800 soldiers. Moreover, the USA also developed the Enduring Freedom Operation in the Indian Ocean and created the Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA) to fight against terrorism.¹⁹¹

The natural partner for the USA is Europe. However, Asia has fast growing markets and populations.¹⁹² The USA has many interests in Asia, having developed strategic and

<<http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Rev%20Placemat.pdf>>(accessed 12/09/2010), p.3.

¹⁸⁶ **Waterman** Shaun, 2010, *Training Afghans a daunting task*, Washington Post, 06/09/2010, Available at: <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/6/training-afghans-a-daunting-task/?page=2>>(accessed 12/09/2010).

¹⁸⁷ **Livington** Ian, **O'Hanlon** Michael E., 2010, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Brookings Institution, 01/09/2010, Available at: <<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf>>(accessed 12/09/2010), p. 19, 23.

¹⁸⁸ **Charillon** Frédéric, 2010, *France and the US: from reluctant alliance to ambiguous rapprochement*, *ibid*, p.190.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁹⁰ **Desloire** Constance, 2010, *La Politique africaine d'Obama: un semblant de rupture?*, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.56.

¹⁹¹ **Desloire** Constance, 2010, *La Politique africaine d'Obama: un semblant de rupture?*, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.57.

¹⁹² **US Census Bureau**, 2010, Foreign Trade Statistics, Available at: <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0012.html>> [accessed 12/08/2010]. In 2009, **US trade with Europe is 258,061.6\$ millions for exports and 331, 215.9\$ millions for imports**, whereas only **with China the US exports are 69.6\$ billions and US imports are 296.4\$ billions** (**The US China Business Council**, 2010, *US-China Trade Statistics and China's World Trade Statistics* Available at: <<http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html>>

military commitments with numerous Asian countries.¹⁹³ As described by Rozoff, US troops as well as “NATO troop deployments, utilization and upgrading of bases, armed combat operations, air patrols, naval surveillance and interdiction, armed forces training programs and regular military exercises now occur on the borders and off the coasts of China (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan), Iran (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates) and Russia (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). There are no longer buffer states between the Western military alliance and major non-NATO nations in Eurasia.”¹⁹⁴ Brzezinski has advocated that, NATO represented 25% of the world population, whereas today it accounts for only 12% of the world population, and financial and military powers are increasing in Asia, so an urgent dialogue with Asian countries is needed to avoid “a regional explosion that could be fatal for NATO”.¹⁹⁵ France and USA have an interest in seeing China’s rise to the status of a great power in a peaceful way, and not creating tensions with Russia. This scenario can happen only if the partners of the western countries, (e.g Australia, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand) cooperate actively with China in a transparent and peaceful way. To achieve that goal, Lieutenant-colonel Charpy advocates for “a pertinent NATO in a globalized world,” with NATO as an organ of consultation for worldwide problems.¹⁹⁶

[accessed 12/08/2010].

¹⁹³ **Reichard** Martin, 2006, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A legal and Political Perspective*, ibid, p.37.

¹⁹⁴ **Rozoff** Rick, 2010, *Central Asia: U.S. Military Buildup On Chinese, Iranian And Russian Borders*, Intel Daily, Available at: <http://inteldaily.com/2010/08/central-asia-u-s-military-buildup/> [Accessed 14/09/2010].

¹⁹⁵ **Brzezinski** Zbigniew, 2009, *An agenda for Nato: Toward a Global Security Web*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009, Available at: <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65240/zbigniew-brzezinski/an-agenda-for-nato> > [accessed 06/09/2010]. Brzezinski is a former American adviser for the national security.

¹⁹⁶ Lieutenant-colonel **Charpy** Emmanuel , 2010, *Interview of Lieutenant-colonel Emmanuel Charpy, NATO Policy Adviser*. Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 08/09/2010. Annex III.

To conclude, there is quite a different geographical military focus between France and the USA, as France is mainly involved in Africa whereas the USA has much wider military commitments. This difference does not create divergences between France and the USA, as long as their military partnerships do not enter into conflict.

3.2 The economic ties and energetic dependencies of both countries

The oil and gas geopolitics are complex and it is difficult to deal with this subject in a few lines. I want to underline 3 important facts. Firstly, the Middle East owns more than 50% of the world's oil reserves and remains strategically important for the NATO countries, as well as the Straits for oil evacuation¹⁹⁷ (for example, the Fifth fleet of the US Navy has a permanent position at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb).¹⁹⁸ Secondly, The UE States depend for more than 75% on their oil and gas consumption from Middle East, Africa and Russia.¹⁹⁹ Thirdly, for many scholars, the oil peak is now and reserves will begin to decrease.²⁰⁰

The French energy independence rate was 50.5% in 2008 (thanks to a large reliance on civil nuclear energy and a large production of electricity), as opposed to 70.3% for the USA.²⁰¹ The volumes are different, as France consumes only 2.23% of the world's oil consumption, whereas the USA needs 22.5% of the whole consumption,²⁰² but both need to secure their

¹⁹⁷ **US Energy Information Administration**, 2009, World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, March 2009, Available at: <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html>> [accessed 20/08/2010].

¹⁹⁸ **Naval Forces Central Command**, 2010, *US Fifth Fleet/ US Central Forces Naval Command*, Available at: <<http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/mission/mission.html>> [accessed 20/08/2010].

¹⁹⁹ **Ministère de la Défense**, 2008, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/livre_blanc_1337/livre_blanc_1340/index.html> [accessed 04/08/2010], p.25.

²⁰⁰ **Kopits Steven R.**, 2010, *EIA: Hard Core Peak Oil Forecast*, **Econbrowser**, 02/06/2010, Available at: <http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2010/06/eia_hard_core_p.html> [accessed 25/08/2010].

²⁰¹ **INSEE**, Available at: <http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?ref_id=NATTEF11310> [accessed 17/08/2010].

²⁰² **Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques**, 2008, *Consommation de pétrole dans le*

energy supplies. In 2008, The USA withdrew 80% of its gas consumption,²⁰³ the difference being imported from Canada (90%). For oil, the USA withdraws only 20.40% of their consumption and is then dependent on its imports.²⁰⁴ In 2008, the US biggest oil imports came from Canada (19.2%), Mexico (10.07%), Saudi Arabia (11.85%), Venezuela (9.2%), Nigeria (7.65%), Iraq (4.84%) and Algeria (4.24%).²⁰⁵ French oil is coming from Africa (29.32% of its imports), mainly from Libya (8.48%), Nigeria (5.24%) and Algeria (4.46%); the Commonwealth of Independent States (27.94%); Middle East (22.02%), mainly Saudi Arabia (8.98%), Iran (5.37%) and Iraq (3.52%); and the North Sea (19.64%).²⁰⁶ France must also import its gas, mainly from Norway (31.64%), the Netherlands (17.8%) and Algeria (16.25%).²⁰⁷ The energy dependencies of France and the USA are then quite different.

In 2008, the USA was the first destination for French Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (17% of French FDI), that is to say the 7th Foreign Investor in the USA (7.2% of FDI) with 163\$ Billion.²⁰⁸ It was also the first destination for the EU FDI, representing 70% of all the FDI USA receipts.²⁰⁹ Conversely, the USA is the principal foreign direct investor in France,

monde, Available at: <http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=98&ref_id=CMPTTEF11336> [accessed 17/08/2010].

²⁰³ **US Energy Information Administration**, 2010, *Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production*, 30/08/2010, Available at: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dc_u_nus_a.htm> [accessed 17/08/2010]. [(gas imports=3,980,608) - gas exports (963,263) + gas withdrawal (19,909,549)] = 22,926,894 → 3,980,608 * 100/ 22,926,894 = 17.36% → 100-17.36= 82.63%.

²⁰⁴ **US Energy Information Administration**, 2010, *U.S. Natural Gas Exports by Country*, 30/08/2010, Available at: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_expc_sl_a.htm> (accessed 17/08/2010), [(oil imports= 7,726,994) – oil exports (659,392) + oil production (1,811,817)] = 8,879,419 → 1,811,817*100/ 8,879,419 = 20.40%.

²⁰⁵ **US Energy Information Administration**, 2010, *U.S. Imports by Country of Origin*, 30/08/2010, Available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbb1_m.htm> (accessed 17/08/2010).

²⁰⁶ **Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques**, 2008, *Provenances du pétrole brut importé en France*, Available at: <http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATTEF11302> (accessed 17/08/2010).

²⁰⁷ **Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques**, 2008, *Production française et importations de gaz naturel en France*, Available at: <http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATTEF11314> (accessed 17/08/2010).

²⁰⁸ **Terrien Bruno**, 2008, *Stock d'investissements directs français à l'étranger au 31 décembre 2008*, **Banque de France**, Available at: <http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/statistiques/telechar/economie_balance/stocks-ide-fr-etr-08.pdf> [accessed 13/08/2010].

²⁰⁹ **U.S Census Bureau**, 2009, *Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States on a Historical-Cost Basis by Selected Country, 2000 to 2008, and by Industry, 2008*, July 2009, Available at:

employing 65000 people in 2008.²¹⁰ The EU represents 60.7% of FDI in France²¹¹ and more than 40% of the US FDI are done in the EU (main investor).²¹² The principal trade partners of the USA are Canada (16.4%), China (14%), Mexico (11.7%), Japan (5.6%), and Germany (4.4%), but the US still remains the main trade partner of the USA.²¹³ In 2008, the principal trade partners of France were Germany (15.6%), Italy (8.49%), Belgium (8.15%), Spain (7.38%), United Kingdom (6.23%), USA (5.69%) and China (4.59%).²¹⁴ Then, France and the USA have different economic ties, but both main partner and first foreign investor are the European Union.

Hypothetically, the new NATO Strategic Concept can be affected by commercial defense considerations.²¹⁵ The world armament market is valued at 300€ billion annually, largely dominated by the American industry (50% of the market).²¹⁶ Defense industrial activity is concentrated on 6 countries: USA, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and United Kingdom. Four European groups (BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thalès) are in the top 15 of the biggest armaments companies, the 11 others being American. From the 10 biggest European groups, 4 are French (Thalès, DCNS, Safran, Dassault Aviation), plus a great participation of France in the EADS European company. Most of the nuclear weapons'

<<http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s1255.pdf> > [accessed 13/09/2010]. 100* (EU FDI : 1,622,911)/(Total FDI :2,278,892)= 71.22%.

²¹⁰ **Terrien Bruno**, 2009, *Stock d'investissements directs étrangers en France au 31 décembre 2008*, **Banque de France**, Available at: <http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/statistiques/telechar/economie_balance/stocks-ide-etr-fr-08.pdf > [accessed 13/08/2010].

²¹¹ Ibid, p. 4.

²¹² **Eurostat**, 2010, STAT/10/93, 24/06/2010, Available at: <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/10/93&type=HTML> >(accessed 13/09/2010).

²¹³ **U.S Census Bureau**, 2010, Available at: <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0912yr.html> > (accessed 17/08/2010).

²¹⁴ **Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques**, 2008, Available at:

<http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATTEF08467 > [accessed 18/08/2010].

²¹⁵ **Dukes Simon**, 2008, *The future of EU-NATO Relations : a case of mutual irrelevance through competition*, **Journal of European Integration**, Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2008, p.37.

²¹⁶ **Ministère de la Défense**, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, Paris, June 2008, Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/livre_blanc_1337/livre_blanc_1340/index.html > [accessed 04/08/2010], p.261.

launch facilities, supporting US B-61 gravity bombs (essentially the American combat aircraft F-16 and the Western European Panavia Tornado), reach the end of their life expectancy.²¹⁷ NATO countries will have to agree on new aircrafts “to carry the nuclear bombs still deployed in a number of NATO countries.”²¹⁸ Moreover the future European missile defense agreement, strongly encouraged by Obama’s US Missile Defense Policy,²¹⁹ will represent a big market for arms companies.

In Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, the best performing oil exploitation in Africa today, is perceived as an economic interest by USA. It is estimated that the Gulf of Guinea dispose of 24 million barrels of reserve and could provide 25% of American oil within 2020, Angola and Nigeria being already the 5th and 6th providers to the USA. The USA established the naval Africa Partnership Station in 2008, and an American satellite radar has been settled in February 2009 in Sao Tomé.²²⁰ Even if it is hazardous to assume a direct correlation between geo-economic interests and military presence, France makes large profits in Africa (40 billion in 2000, as opposed to 50 billion in the USA, whereas the volume of exportation was 4 times less)²²¹ and has a large military presence.

To conclude, in regards to these economic and energy dependencies, it is possible to observe that USA ties are very different from the French ones, as geographical aspects greatly

²¹⁷ **Trimble** Stephen, 2009, [Egypt deal extends F-16 line into 2013](http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/12/30/336679/egypt-deal-extends-f-16-line-into-2013.html), Flightglobal, 30/12/2009, Available at: <<http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/12/30/336679/egypt-deal-extends-f-16-line-into-2013.html>> [accessed 04/08/2010] and **Martin**, Guy, 2008, All The World's Tornados, *Air Forces Monthly*, Key Publishing, October 2008, p.56.

²¹⁸ **Kamp** Karl Heinz, **Yost** David S., 2009, *NATO and the 21st Century Deterrence*, NATO Defense College: NDC Forum Paper 08, Roma, May 2009, p.9 and 57: “According to open sources, the US continues to station a number of B-61 gravity bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, for use by US and European aircraft (except for the UK, where they are reserved for US use).”

²¹⁹ **US official at NATO**, 2010, Interview of a US Official at NATO, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 09/09/2010. Annex IV.

²²⁰ **Desloire** Constance, 2010, *La Politique africaine d’Obama: un semblant de rupture?*, Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.56.

²²¹ **Survie**, 2010, *Les entreprises françaises en Afrique : pillage contre transparence*, 16/02/2010, Available at: <<http://survie.org/francafrique/diplomatie-business-et-dictatures/article/les-entreprises-francaises-en>> [accessed 11/09/2010].

influence their respective interdependence. Of course, these are short-term considerations; long-term projections, such as the diminution of key primary resources can also influence actual military choices, such as the strategic return of USA in Africa.

3.3 The strategic divergences of the 2 countries toward Turkey

According to a US official, issues related to Turkey affect the ability of NATO allies to reach consensus on a new strategic concept.²²² First of all, Obama's and Sarkozy's administrations differ on the manner Turkey could achieve its role "as a bridge between East and West."²²³ The main discrepancy emerges from their divergent views toward Turkey's will to become an EU member. Obama, as Bush before him, urges EU countries to accept Turkey.²²⁴ In Robert Gates' opinion, the new Ottoman policy of Turkey, more accommodating toward Arabic countries, is the result of recurrent exclusion from certain EU members, read France and Germany, which are those accountable for Turkey's turning away from the West.²²⁵ However, in the light of the recent events, such as the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations, or the Brazilian-Turkish-Iranian agreement on uranium enrichment, Gate's understanding is far from being accurate.²²⁶

France is radically opposed to Turkish EU membership, invoking danger for the EU's

²²² **US official at NATO**, 2010, Interview of a US Official at NATO, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 09/09/2010. Appendix IV.

²²³ **Department of State**, *Transcript of the remarks by President Obama and President Sarkozy*, Caen, 06/06/2009, Available at: <<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/June/20090606145336ptellivremos0.2221491.html>> [accessed 01/09/2010].

²²⁴ **Fischer Sébastien**, 2010, *Turkey and the EU: Obama Bashing in Bavaria and Paris*, 04/07/2009, Available at: <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,druck-617868,00.html>> (accessed 16/08/2010).

²²⁵ **BBC**, 2010, *US Defense Secretary Gates blames EU for Turkey 'drift'*, 9/06/2010, Available at: <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10275379>> (accessed 18/08/2010).

²²⁶ **International Crisis Group**, 2010, Europe Report N°208, Executive Summary, 08/09/2010, Available at: <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/208-turkeys-crises-over-israel-and-iran.aspx>> (accessed 10/09/2010).

political harmony, the stability of EU's borders, and the internal problems of Turkey with Kurds.²²⁷ Obama is aware of differences between the EU and Turkey, but believes it is possible to make a Turkish exception, to prize it for its benevolence towards Western interests.²²⁸ According to Billion, the disapprobation of Sarkozy is more due to an internal political calculus, having a very functional aspect: The French right-wing argues about the cultural clash which could emerge if the Union includes a country with a major Muslim population,²²⁹ a way to create a majority in France around conservative values, through an identity opposed against the immigrant population, emphasising its problems of integration. To distract Turkey's attention, Sarkozy values the key-role Turkey would play within the Mediterranean Union, remaining at the periphery of the EU.²³⁰

Another delicate issue concerns Cypriot-Turkish conflicting relations. Cyprus has been an EU member since 2004. Since Turkey occupies *de facto* the North of Cyprus, it lobbies for the non-adhesion to Turkey in the EU. However, Turkey is part of NATO and the Partnership for Peace, lobbying for the non-integration of Cyprus into the NATO framework. The resolution of the Turkish-Cypriot dispute is then primordial "for the future operability of EU-led operations using NATO and Turkish assets."²³¹ Turkey's support to the EU defence force was until now secured by the secret "Ankara document", reproduced verbatim into the 2002 Presidency Conclusions of the Europeans Council, ensuring that the ESDP would never be used against a NATO member and obliging the consultation of a member if any operations are

²²⁷ **Charillon** Frédéric, 2010, *France and the US: from reluctant alliance to ambiguous rapprochement*, *ibid*, p.195.

²²⁸ **Shea** Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010. Appendix II.

²²⁹ **Billion** Didier, 2010, *Nicolas Sarkozy et la Turquie : une double rupture*, **Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques**, La Revue Internationale et stratégique, N° 77, Spring 2010, p.158.

²³⁰ **Speech of Nicolas Sarkozy** in Toulon, 07/02/2010, Available at: <<http://sites.univ-provence.fr/veronis/Discours2007/transcript.php?n=Sarkozy&p=2007-02-07>> [accessed 13/08/2010].

²³¹ **Meltem Müftüleri-Baç**, 2010, *The EU Accession Negotiations with Turkey*, *ibid*, p.71.

conducted in its geographic proximity.²³² Nevertheless, the European reticence for the Turkish adhesion to the EU, limits Turkey's will to cooperate actively with the ESDP and increase the EU losses coming from the marginalisation of Turkey. Moreover, as Müftüleri-Baç sustains, Turkey has a unique position, bringing the Middle Eastern and European cultures closer, the cultural distance being one of the causes of terrorism.²³³

In opposition to France, Turkey and the USA share a common perceived threat from Syria, because of its short-range ballistic missiles.²³⁴ The Turkish need for protection plays into Obama's hand in order to press for the development of ballistic missile defence, forcing France to negotiate Obama's plans for Europe, in spite of its desire to diminish defence expenses. Moreover, "Turkey plays a critical role for the security of Europe's energy needs."²³⁵ Turkey is at a crossroad, with "long established Iraqi oil pipelines to Iskendrum" and the Turkish Straights linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, which confer to this country a strategic importance for the EU.²³⁶ The Cooperation of the EU with Turkey is also vital for the stability of EU's borders with the Black Sea region (as it is acknowledged by the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation since 2007). With 2 new projects, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and the Nabucco project (a pipeline construction linking Turkey to Austria (forecast to be complete in 2013), Turkey will be an alternative to the EU's dependence on Russia and will become critical for EU energy security policy.²³⁷

²³² **The European Union**, 2002, *Presidency Conclusions of the Europeans Council*, Brussels, 24-25 Oct. 2002, Appendix II, p.17-18, Available at: <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/Download/4758/2002_Brussels_24-25_Ekim.pdf>(accessed 17/08/2010).

²³³ **Meltem Müftüleri-Baç**, 2010, *The EU Accession Negotiations with Turkey*, ibid, p.73.

²³⁴ **US official at NATO**, personal interview, 09/09/2010, Annex IV.

²³⁵ **Meltem Müftüleri- Baç**, 2010, *The EU Accession Negotiations with Turkey* in **Jones Erik, Van Genugten Sakia**, *The future of European foreign policy*, Routledge: New York, 2009, p.67.

²³⁶ **Aydin, Açikmese**, 2004, *To be or not to be with Turkey: December 2004 blues for the EU*, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 3(3), 47-58, 2004, p.54.

²³⁷ **Meltem Müftüleri- Baç**, *The EU Accession Negotiations with Turkey*, ibid, p.68.

To conclude, there is a strong cooperation between the EU, the US and Turkey, for economic, geopolitical and defence matters, which are important for Turkish and NATO's prominence in the region. However, besides those mutual interests, strong divergences and misunderstandings remain, affecting the ESDP NATO cooperation.

Conclusion

NATO is the unique historical experience of an international military alliance. As Secretary

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reminds us, NATO remains the ultimate insurance policy for almost 1 billion (actually 900 million) people in 28 countries.²³⁸ The negotiation of a new NATO strategic concept is then of the utmost importance. However, NATO's future is still undefined, as has been demonstrated throughout the analysis of the main national interests of France and the USA, 2 major NATO members. A summary of their key discrepancies is necessary.

First of all, France and the USA demonstrate a different understanding of NATO's deterrence force. The enemy's personification is different regarding South Asian threats, as well as the perception of terrorism from the Middle East. In fact, contrary to the USA, France does not consider Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and Syria as a "rogue state", which enables a different appreciation of the Middle East political exchequer, corroborated by the topical dispute regarding the sale of weapons to the LAF.

This different perception of threat only partially explains the different nuclear policies of both countries. Paris is reticent to accept the NATO ballistic missile defense program promoted by Washington, essentially for fiscal reasons, as France would have wanted to commit resources diversely or in another extent. In fact, the financial gap and discrepancies in performance create tensions toward NATO's future role, as France diminishes its defense expenditures while the USA increases them.

The study of the French and American's power projections revealed a diverse geographical orientation. Besides its 250 military bases, the USA's involvement towards Europe decreases, while its attention towards the East increases. France, on the contrary, has a very Eurocentric power projection, as demonstrated in its commitment towards the ESDP. America's implementation into Africa has been a failure, despite its military partnership with many African countries, whereas France's power projection is mainly in Africa, where almost

²³⁸ General **Rasmussen** Anders Fogh, 2010, *First NATO Press conference*, 03/08/2010, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56776.htm> (accessed 02/09/2010)

all its permanent military bases abroad reside. Nevertheless, it is not sure that France perceives the US arrival in Africa negatively, as it could help with fighting against terrorism. In the Middle East, France is bandwagoning the USA, committing more troops in Afghanistan and following the US foreign policy toward Iran. However, I interpret Abu Dhabi's new French military base as a relative swinging towards the USA, as it could also enable many new commercial possibilities.²³⁹ American interest towards Central and Eastern Asia, is rising, as demonstrated by the recent military partnerships developed with countries of those regions, whereas France does not develop any military partnerships there.

A huge discrepancy between France and the USA concerns their conceptions of NATO and the ESDP. For France, NATO is a collective security mechanism, which must focus on the Transatlantic homeland defense. Consequently, France's strict interpretation of NATO's Article 5 is opposed to a globalization of NATO's role, to an enlargement of NATO's geographical sensitivity, and to the development of civilian capacities for NATO. According to the USA, NATO represents an opportunity to achieve and legitimize its foreign policy, to share expenses in order to underpin global security, and to project power in Europe. This incongruity is crystallized and exacerbated through the deviating views France and the USA adopted toward Turkey.

France views the ESDP as a civil-military instrument which will enhance French and European power projections. Furthermore, France considers the duplication of NATO's units as a real potential outcome, a way to intervene when a consensus is not reached within NATO or when the mission would be better achieved through another "flag." The USA considers this duplication as a waste of resources. According to the USA, the ESDP is an opportunity to

²³⁹ **Le Point**, 2009, *Les militaires français prennent leur quartier à Abou Dhabi*, 26/05/2009, Available at : <http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-politique/2009-05-26/les-militaires-francais-prennent-leur-quartier-a-abou-dhabi/917/0/346514> (Accessed 14/09/2010). In the region, Abu Dhabi is the first customer of French's defense industry in the region, forecasting to buy 60 Rafales. France will also try to sell the first nuclear power station of the Emirates, in direct competition with the United States, for a contract of €50 billion.

increase European willingness to commit defense resources, but does not have to be developed to the detriment of NATO. Ideally, the USA would like to see the ESDP focusing only on civilian operations and NATO on military operations. The USA maintains a form of control over the ESDP because the latter still needs NATO's military support for any large crisis management operation.

To conclude, despite their large cooperation and the praise of this collaboration by Obama and Sarkozy, both countries demonstrate a huge gap in technological and financial capacities, diverse power projections, as well as different military, economic and commercial interests. Therefore, their diverse needs and expectations towards NATO and the ESDP could create illegitimate goals²⁴⁰. To avoid this potential conflict, a transcendental solution would be to Europeanize NATO, placing a European officer in charge of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples. A transformation of the decision-making process of the NAC is also necessary, instituting a two-thirds majority vote instead of the unanimity rule. As a result, Europe would not be tempted to duplicate or decouple NATO's functions into the ESDP and would accept without reluctance the "burden sharing" of the new anti-missile shield, a deeper globalization of NATO, and the development of its consultant capacities. Finally, as Karl Deutsch asserted, "what characterizes a security community is not the absence of conflicts among its members, but instead, their peaceful resolution."²⁴¹

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²⁴¹ **Gheciu** Alexandra, 2008, *Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post -9/11*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p.3.

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Annex I: Multi-tier NATO: a framework ²⁴²

Issue	Status quo	Reversal	Reformer
Raison d'être	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic states	USA, Britain
Threat Perception	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic states	USA, Britain, Canada
Europeanization	France, Germany*		USA, Britain, Poland
Article 5	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic states	USA, Britain, Canada
Enlargement	Germany, France, Spain, Italy	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic states	USA, Britain*
Global NATO	Germany, France, Spain, Italy	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic states	USA, Britain*, Canada*
Afghanistan	Germany, Spain, Italy, Turkey	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic states	USA, Britain, Canada, Netherlands
Capabilities (missile defense, NRF)	Germany, France	Poland, Czech Republic	USA, Britain

* Undecided; highly dependent on the particular domestic setting

Appendix II: Shea Jamie, 2010, *Interview of Jamie Shea, NATO director of policy planning*, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 22/07/2010.

- **In your view, what would be the main divergent points between US and France?**

These days, they are far fewer frequent points of divergence between France and United States on what NATO was reduce to for decades after General De Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated structure in 1967. Indeed, there is a sort of rapprochement spectaculaire around several sorts of things. The first thing of course is that France reintegrated the NATO

²⁴² Noetzel Timo, Schreer Benjamin, Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change, *International Affairs* 85: 2, 2009, p.223

military structure over a year now, especially since the Strasbourg summit, on the decision of President Sarkozy, which does imply a kind of “*apaisement*” between France and the United States in NATO. Secondly, the French and the United States are very keen in transforming the alliance, reducing the command structure, getting rid of redundant NATO agencies, making the organisation a sort of “*plus performante*”. There is certainly a sort of commonality between Paris and Washington on that topic. The Americans have been much more positive about the European Union defence role, the recognition of the CFSP, the importance of the Lisbon treaty. If anything, the Americans are disappointed that the EU hasn’t produced more. It is something that has begun during the Bush administration and has continued during the Obama administration, so there is not this kind of “*frilosité*” in Washington, as there used to be. The other side in the EU, is a sort of plan to weaken or to destroy this side of Brussels. There are a couple of areas where there are divergent interests. For example, the nuclear issue. The French are the apostles of the traditional view of nuclear deterrence and don’t really sign up to the vision of Obama’s free nuclear world. The French are not in favour of modifying NATO nuclear posture. They are not in favour of removing the sub-strategic nuclear weapon from Europe. Also when it comes to missile defence, they see that, au maximum, as a complement to nuclear deterrence, but certainly not as a substitute for nuclear deterrence or something which provide a cover for EU to reduce nuclear weapon. I think on the nuclear issue, there are some divergences, but I wouldn’t call it a kind of “*bruit transatlantique*”. It is not as if the rhetoric is flying across the Atlantic like it did between the Bush administration and Chirac at the time of the Iraq war. It is much more a sort of technocratic debate among experts, but there are some differences. The French are playing a big role in Afghanistan, maybe the Americans are disappointed that France hasn’t put more troops into Afghanistan, even if Sarkozy has made an effort. But at least, the French have been supportive of that particular mission.

About the new NATO strategic concept, France is playing a constructive role. They did not propose any counter project or a totally different vision for the future of NATO *vis-à-vis* the others. When it comes to military transformation, *Le livre Blanc* points to many of the same direction as the Madeline Albright group, when it came to the future of the priorities. There is a quite high degree of commonality. Maybe it’s not going to last, but it is definitely there for the time being.

- **Do you think United States and France have the same idea of priorities and focusing on the same points?**

The Americans would like NATO to have more civilian capabilities. In fact, in Afghanistan, the UN, the EU have not been very present compared with the military side represented by NATO. The Americans argue therefore that NATO must have more civilian planning capabilities, civilians experts. So we can feel a sort of will for a peace civil plan before the NGOs or the government civilian experts or the UE, the UN arrive. The French consider this is a duplication of the EU or the UN, they believe NATO is first of all a military alliance, having for vocation military matters and therefore they don’t like the American emphasis on giving NATO more civilian functions.

Another point is that the French still believe NATO is a defence organisation. They are more sceptical than the American when it comes to concepts as “*OTAN gendarme du monde*” or “*l’OTAN touche a tout*” especially when NATO advocates for dealing with energy security. They consider it useless, not understanding NATO added value for energy security, the EU being already dealing with it. So, the French take a more restricted view of NATO, whereas the Americans tend to take a more expanded view in terms of the number of different topics or

new challenges NATO could take on.

- **Do you think this restrictive view that France adopted toward NATO is motivated by a desirable emphasis on Europe, whereas the United Nations would like to extend the range of NATO action in the world?**

The United Nations would like to have NATO as a sub-contractor, supplying troops and security services but under the United Nations control, or at least over the very minimum under the United Nations Security Council mandate, whereas NATO likes to have the UNSC mandate as a kind of endorsement, but then to operate more autonomously. NATO never declared itself to be original organisation under the UN. NATO likes to keep a bit of autonomy and strategic distance vis a vis the UN. France would like to have NATO concentrated on its military function and not getting involved in more political civilian type tasks. When France believes that the new security challenge is basically civilian, for example for terrorism or police, intelligence services or energy security, which is more a commercial type of things, they don't like NATO giving the impression that there is a militarization of all problems.

Another thing the French are sensitive is NATO Partnerships. The French are being sensitive when they believe that what NATO is trying to do is to create a kind of Nations Unies bis. They are afraid NATO is gonna bring into it the Indian, the Chinese, the Russians, the Indonesians, and became involved into North-South rivalities or being a rival to the UN, in terms of being a kind of global security framework. When NATO goes beyond Europe, the French believe it should be the exception, whereas the Americans tend to believe with Europe everything is finished: these days everything is good in Europe, Europe is a place of peace and the challenges are now in Afghanistan, in Irak, in the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East and that NATO should be basically out of Europe. Then French tend to see Europe more in its traditional role, a collective defence in Europe. The French do not say no to Afghanistan, but they say it is the exception, it does not create a precedent.

- **Regarding the role of ESDP, you said the United States want the development of it. Sarkozy, in most of its discourses made the link between the reintegration of France within NATO and the development of the role of the European Defence force. Is there a convergence of views between Obama and Sarkozy?**

Yes. The problem is more coming from the Europeans. Nowadays, it is not the Americans who are blocking this evolution. In the past, the Europeans always said "we want to build Europe but there is the opposition of the United States who consider it as a threat for the survival of NATO". Today, the United States are very under pressure, with the financial crisis, with the world pressure in Afghanistan, they are then very pragmatic, they don't care if it is NATO or if it is the Eu, as long as somebody in Europe provides the resources. It is a problem for both France and the Americans, particularly during the French presidency of the EU, with the very ambitious plans of Sarkozy and Bernard Kouchner for the CSFP. The French and the American have probably not been able to mobilize a defence effort among the Europeans, while the budget is collapsing, there is the problem of modernization, the lack of progress with the European Union, the permanent structure of the corporation system, the problem with the European defence program and projects. It is not completely bleak: there are obviously some positive things. But the real problem is not anymore the American "interdit", which has been lifted, but more on the Europe unconsistence among the European themselves, who are not willing to make the effort to produce a sort of viable European defence structure. Many of

the traditional problems, as duplication, lack of investments in Research and Development, lack of investment in training and so on are issues that have been around for a long time but haven't made any progress unfortunately. The issue for France is then that the old excuse of the American opposition is gone and now the spotlight is more on the European themselves

- **Do you think US and France have the same notion of threat, in particular regarding the notion of terrorism? As we know, Hezbollah is not considered in France, as in United States, as a terrorist group.**

In the past, it is true that the United States considered a lot of Palestinian group as terrorist groups, as well as Hezbollah, the PKK, the Kurds, which were not recognized as terrorist organisations in the European Union, not just in Paris, but also more broadly in the European Union. The notion of terrorism is relative, what can be a terrorist group for one can be a freedom fighters group for another. The Hezbollah, the Muslim brotherhood have a social dimension or caritative actions or can be considered as fighting for a nationalist cause rather than being the instrument of the international Jihadism. The Eu has in fact followed the United States in putting many of these organizations on the list of proscribed organizations since the last couple of years. There may be still a couple of divergences, but much more commonality than a few years ago.

Today, the United States is much more focused on Yemen at the moment, Irak, Afghanistan, whereas France is much more focus on Algeria and North Africa. So, the problem is not so much on nomenclature, but is more a problem of focus. Al Quaeda is also organized in the Maghreb and potentially could be also a threat from there to United States. But there is a different sort of geographical focal point. However, there has been a lot of cooperation between France and United States on terrorism. One of the French bombers during 09/11 was a French national, being the second men in the group: he was trialled in an American civil court. Since then there has been a lot of cooperation on terrorism, even on the high of the differences between Bush and Chirac over the Iraq issue.

- **It seems that the United States wants to revalue the role of Turkey, whereas France, because of the problem with the integration of Turkey within the European Union, tend to marginalize its role within NATO. Do you think the United States and France have the same position on Turkey?**

Yes, there is a divergence on Turkey, which is not specific to France, as it is shared by Italy and Germany. The Americans largely believe that Turkey's strategic importance, Turkey is a middle east actor, Turkey is an Islamic democracy that bridge between the Europe and the Islamic world. Therefore, a couple of days ago, Rob Gates, the current American secretary of defence, said the problem of the moment is that Turkey is turning away from the West. In the press today, there are a lot of articles about the new Ottoman policy. For Gates, the one to blame is the EU, because it did not offer a place to Turkey. Of course, the French don't like that, saying this is no sense, Turkey did not match the membership criteria, "you Americans will not like if we say that Mexico should be invited to join the United States." France sees Turkey as a problem for the respect of rules, legal, social and economic convergence, whereas the Americans tend to see Turkey as a Middle East strategic actor and a bridge with the Muslim world and therefore believe the way to act in Turkey and the West, the Eu, should make a Turkish exception. The French knows that because of the popular opposition to the integration of Turkey into the EU, in France, Germany, Austria, Spain, the only way to overcome those negative polls (as Chirac was asking for a referendum) is to demonstrate that

Turkey is truly a European country. It is a little bit the old chicken leg: we will get married and you will fall in love with me afterwards; against let's fall in love first, decide we like each other and then we get married. For the French it is a decision for the United States, it is a decision for the European Union, do not come into our internal affairs.

- **Regarding the missile defence, as we know, Iran is being considered as a threat, even for the European Union. Do you think the fact that Obama cancelled the proposal for an anti-missile base in Poland and Czech Republic could create troubles for the new NATO strategic plan?**

Besides the fact that France and United States are not always in line, the French are not against a missile defence. They are in fact even developing a missile defence on their own. But they are arguing about the opportunity of having a NATO system of timing. There is the financial crisis, the priority must go to helicopter, Afghanistan, other kind of priorities. The other thing is that the French still believe that Iran must be deter by nuclear deterrence, with an automatic response. The Americans consider that Iran is not a rational actor and therefore we need a defence to be sure. We need then both, nuclear and military deterrence. The French are more confident with naked deterrence, "la dissuasion pure, in order to hold Iran in check. There is then a sort of strategic dichotomy.

The other thing is that France does not want to decide on a NATO missile defence before they know all of the financial implications. The French do not want a blind date on missile defence, they want to have all elements before to take a decision rather than the other way round.

At the other side, there is an absolute convergence on Iran. In fact, it is often Sarkozy who blame Obama to don't be enough tough with Iran. The French have become the leaders of the ones that want sanctions on Iraq, in the UN, the French are very worried about the Iranian nuclear program and the consequences on the Middle East and are sceptical on the Obama's offer to negotiate with Iranians.

- **We know that France has sold or is selling some Mistral boats to Russia. Do you believe that France and United States have the same view on Russia?**

Now, yes, because Obama has invested a lot in the relationship with Medvedev (not so much Putin but more Medvedev), they spoke a few days ago in Washington about the reset button. The Americans are concluding a civil nuclear agreement with Russia and helping the Russian to integrate the World Trade Organisation, they have been comforting on Iran as Medvedev agreed for UN sanctions, so everything is alright. The Americans have aligned themselves with the French position toward Russia than the contrary. So there is not a big divergence on this. One of the things Medvedev clearly wants is the modernization of its army. The Americans do not have any particular objection of the sell of the Mistral, as long as the French give only the boat and not the technology that goes with it. If the French send to the

Russians the Mistral with the technology inside, then the Americans will be worried, not only for the capacity that would give to the Russian, but also because of the technological transfer.

- **Do you think that the US and France agree on what is the role of NATO?**

Probably not. In the short term, yes, with the priority on Afghanistan, the reform of NATO, but the Americans generally take a globalist view of the alliance whereas the French prefer to keep it on its traditional mission, collective defence, military alliance, and then want more limited ambition for NATO. For the time being, the Americans are also facing a financial crisis, they are under pressure in Afghanistan, so the Americans are not pushing too hard for a big future for NATO. With Obama, they are very focus on the short term, the day problem, the media, but particularly not next year. So, to some degree, in the short-medium term, there is a convergence between France and the United States on the immediate priorities. On the long term, there are divergences, but France is not pushing too much to reduce NATO and the Americans are not pushing too much to expand NATO's scope, but there is not a big debate for the moment.

- **Do you know if the actual negotiations already permitted to adopt a common definition of the NATO budget?**

The French were worried about the bad management of the NATO financial resources, especially because there was a debt of 640 million of Euros at the beginning of the year, most of it caused by Afghanistan. The French has the tendency to say that it shows the bad financial management, as France has been taken by surprised and they were not aware of the situation, there is a lack of transparency. So the French are pushing for an overall reform to improve financial procedures to prevent from having again a so huge debt. So they agree to pay the debt in exchange of a financial reform. The French want to keep the budget static or even diminish it, whereas the Americans are in favour of increasing the NATO budget. But, at the moment, most of the European countries are in a difficult financial situation so the French are not alone in this policy. The Germans, the Brits are equally keen to save money in NATO at the moment. So the French are not isolated and they can speak in the name of a number of other countries too.

- **Do you think that the role of NATO is influenced by this financial debate, regarding in particular its 2 functions, the deterrence and peace building?**

For sure, the financial crisis obliges people to focus on the core tasks and the ones that cost less. Of course, waiting to be attacked, a thing that should not happened, is cheaper that sending forces in Afghanistan which costs billions of Euros. That is why the French advocate for a back to the basics, Article 5, collective defence and focus on Europe, as well as helping reducing the costs of NATO expenditures. But the situation is that we are in Afghanistan and we can't win in Afghanistan tomorrow, the French are pragmatic and understand that this scenario can happen only after Afghanistan and not in the present time.

- **In regards to the development of the US regional command AFRICOM, in Africa, do you think there can be some divergence and conflict of interest between France and United States in Africa?**

The American still did not find a place for the headquarter of their regional command in Africa and is still based in Stuttgart, whereas France is well implemented in Djibuti, in the Horn of Africa, and through the European Union in Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Moreover, the European Union has a straight relation with the African Union for military training and especially counter-piracy near the Somalian coast, as well as with a terrestrial force in Somalia even if it is only at an embryonic level. In the meantime, French are realist, they know that in Mali or perhaps in Kenya or in Sudan with Al Shebab, the Americans will do a return to Africa after the disappointments of the Clinton administration in Somalia. On the other hand, France is not for a NATO role in Africa. France consider more a work division with NATO in the great Middle East, Afghanistan and Irak, whereas the European Union could work with its ex colonies thanks to its privileged ties for countries like France, Spain, UK, then the European Union focusing on Africa.

France will do nothing to stop the deployment of the US regional command center, but are quite happy without saying it that the Americans have problems to implement and find a place to host their center. The European Union, with its diplomatic and economic ties with Africa have already a considerable advance. That is why most of the European Union mission have taken place, at the great majority, in Africa., whereas NATO until now have only known a mission of counterpiracy near the coast of Somalia. Then France use the pretext of these precedents for a specialization of NATO in Middle East and EU in Africa.

- **Are there divergent interests on the NATO Partnership Policy between United States and France?**

France is not against these Partnerships but consider them in a European and Mediterranean context, that is to say the boundaries of Europe. The Americans push more for Partnerships with Asia, Indonesia, Cina, the emerging powers. In a French view, the risk is the globalisation of NATO. Hubert Vedrine was used to say that NATO is the Organisation of North Atlantic and not the Organization of the Pacific North. Even if Vedrine is not Minister anymore, it is always this mentality that continue to prevail in Paris.

- **It is Madeline Albright who has been in charge of directing the work of the commission on the new NATO strategic concept. Do you believe that this new concept is following American's interests or is more based on mutual interests?**

It is more based on mutual interests. The Americans are so focused on Afghanistan that they haven't redeveloped an Agenda for the future of NATO. There have been very few speeches of Hillary Clinton or Bob Gates or Obama on NATO in se, rather than the role of NATO in Afghanistan. So the urgent has become much more important than the important. Madeleine has European roots, being born in Czech Republic and lived there, speaking Czech and Russian, so she's a very European American. She was conscious that if her product was built in United States, it would not have had a so huge impact and she was conscious she had to take European views on board. She heard particularly the desire of Eastern-Europeans to put more emphasis on the traditional role of Article 5, because they are nervous about Russia. She really tried to come out with something balanced. She knew that it was in her own interest to do something which was out at the first round.

Appendix III: Lieutenant-colonel **Charpy** Emmanuel, 2010, *Interview of Lieutenant-colonel Emmanuel Charpy, NATO Policy Adviser*. Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 08/09/2010. Appendix III.

- **In your view, what would be the main divergent points between the US and France within the negotiation of the new strategic concept for NATO?**

The fundamental difference is always the same one, that is to say the nature of NATO. This question is not completely resolved, which means there is a background divergence. Then there will be a consensus on the general view of NATO on Article 5, collective defence, deterrence, and even on the importance of partnerships but the determination of civil

capacities and the missile capabilities will be a matter of divergence between France and United States. Concerning crisis management, NATO is not doing a lot of prevention whereas it should be part of crisis management. France being opposed to a large vision of NATO does not consider that prevention should not be part of NATO's functions, where the USA considers it should be one of NATO's functions as there are no other institutions capable to do it. The USA wants to extend the understanding of Article 5, as opposed to the French understanding, even if each development will be done on a case by case basis.

- **Do you think France and the United States have a common view on partnership policy?**

The USA is fundamentally much more global than France, who focus on the Euro-Atlantic zone. Then, for the USA, it is important to create a global network, a dialogue to preserve international society from crisis before they appeared, whereas France is much more bound by the Washington treaty, focusing on the core business of NATO than a development of network. France does not see the link with the security of NATO allied, or less directly than USA can perceive it.

- **To what extent the respective energetic policies of France and the USA affect their geopolitical position? Do those divergences have an impact on their views toward the new NATO strategic concept?**

Energetic matters are much larger than what NATO can do, as it entails energetic diversification, economic and commercial considerations rather than military matters. Then contribution of NATO until has been quite reduced concerning the protection of critical infrastructures. France agrees with that view, considering that commerce and commercial considerations are already dealt by the EU, no duplications are necessary. The EU already deals with the creation of pipelines and energetic security, so the only value NATO could add would be the protection of critical infrastructures, with however an evolution which would be, following the operation along the Somalian coast against piracy, maritime seaways should be included within the critical infrastructures.

- **Do you think Africa is becoming an issue for the United States? As it is one of the last places where France can claim to be a major power, do you think there is competition between the USA and France for the control of Africa?**

The return of the USA in Africa is not considered as a threat by France. The United States are much more present now in Africa with the creation of Africom, with counter terrorism initiatives, reinforcement of seaway security along western African coasts. There is not anymore a french predominance in Africa, only special ties, a common language, but security challenges are much more larger than specific and privileged zones that France act in. So if we consider all African regions, the help of the USA is really welcomed.

- **It seems that the United States wants to revalue the role of Turkey, whereas France, because of the problem with the integration of Turkey within the European Union, tend to marginalize its role within NATO. How do you think the divergence between United States and France towards Turkey can affect the new**

Strategic concept?

No. This is a European Matter. The United States already expressed itself to say what were their hopes related the Turkish EU membership, but being aware it is a European problem; the new Strategic Concept will not undermine the EU freedom of choice concerning that matter. However, it is sure there are some blocking points linked to that problem between the EU and NATO.

- **What is the actual American position toward the protection of Europe from the ballistic missile proliferation? Do you think there is a convergent position between France and the USA toward the US nuclear presence in Europe?**

It is important to distinguish the US nuclear presence in Europe and the anti-missile shield or anti missile defence. Regarding the US nuclear presence, there is a convergence of views. The 2 countries own nuclear power and even if the USA sustains a free nuclear world as an objective whereas France consider it as an ideal, there is no real opposition. Moreover, even if the USA proclaims to want a free nuclear world, they are also aware of the importance of nuclear weapon in the contemporaneous world.

Concerning the anti-missile shield, the convergence is more difficult, not because of a divergent conception of threat or the importance to be protected against missiles (as it is mentioned in the 2008 french white paper), but because of technological and industrial implications that have to be taken into considerations, as well as the anti-missile capacity, which is considered generally as being a shield whereas France do not believe it can be considered as a real deterrence. The USA want to have the anti-missile being part of NATO, whereas France considers that there is much more to do before to accept this anti missile plan to be part of NATO.

Concerning industrial implications, the development of anti-missile defence will necessitate threat detection equipment, command and control tools, communication and ballistic anti missiles. The US is leading this field. If Europe engaged its financial resources in this expensive project, it means that EU will have less capacities to develop other projects or to develop its own anti missile capacities for NATO if Eu decide so. So an equilibrium must be found for EU countries , in order to participate financially but also to develop its own research and development of technology and industry for the anti missile system.

- **Do you think United States and France have the same idea of priorities and focusing on the same points?**

Priorities are not completely opposed. For the moment there are no decisions regarding the anti missile policy (but which could bring divergences) no political statements regarding the global mission of NATO. There is a different approach between USA which has investment capacities for defence and the will do to it for NATO, and EU countries which are more concerned about reducing their expenses regarding defence.

- **Do you believe France and the USA have the same perception of threat?**

There is a growing convergence. Everybody recognizes that proliferation, terrorism and energetic security are threats. But the divergences arrive when it is question to consider if NATO has to deal with those threats, or not. The USA has a much larger view than France, much more focus on the Euro Atlantic zone. So both countries agree on the threat but not so

much on the risks encountered by those threats.

- **What do you think are the respective positions of France and the United States towards Russia?**

Within NATO, there are divergent positions, having more or less confidence in Russia. France and the USA are both trying to engage with Russia, even if the USA has more difficulties than France, because the French perception concerning energetic security is that it has to be taken into consideration where for the USA, it is just a security issue. So France is much keener to develop stronger relations with Russia. For Sarkozy, if Russia is a real partner, they have to be treated as real partners, as reveal it the sale of the Mistral boats; the USA also are keen to develop partnership but more in a hidden way.

- **Can we consider the French foreign policy as more pragmatic than the USA?**

France is very pragmatic, but the United States as well. The United States have developed many forum over the world, NATO being only one security forum even if it is THE transatlantic forum, but the USA is a global actor. The conception of OTAN Gendarme du monde has been forgotten, because of the European opposition, so the conception is now: “ a pertinent NATO in a globalized world”, which means it is not NATO acting everywhere but NATO must be aware of threats and consult non NATO allies even if problems do not concerned the Euro Atlantic area; not only to act but to understand the security implications for partners and understand how NATO can add value. That is a very different understand of NATO “gendarme du monde” as it was presented some years ago.

- **Is there a geographical division between ESDP and NATO?**

No, there is no geographical division between both institutions. For France, for each crisis, it should be possible to consult between the different international institutions to know what is the best organization to act, in function of the available and adequate resources . There is a need of different affiliations, in function of the crisis political situation.

- **Does the nomination of Stephane Abrial as NATO Supreme Allied Commander enable to Europeanize NATO?**

Stephane Abrial is a NATO Commander, so its mission is not to push for reforms that France would like to do, but of course he is French and it brings a French understanding.

Appendix IV: US official at NATO, 2010, Interview of a US Official at NATO, Interviewed by Guillaume Nicaise [phone] London, 09/09/2010.Appendix IV.

- **In your view, what would be the main divergent points between US and France?**

France has a number of incentives to keep the evolution of the European Union, especially its strategic and defence structures in mind as it looks to NATO's new security concept , where it is something the US has much less focus on. That may be a source of different emphasis between the 2 governments when they look at NATO strategic concept. France is looking at it not only as a NATO allied but also as a major power within the European Union and its institutions. France needs to keep its national interests equally protected in both forums, whereas the US has a national interest and an alliance interest, but beyond that fence there is

this notion of European Union and where the divergence can emerge from.

- **What is the actual American position toward the protection of Europe from the ballistic missile proliferation? Do you think there is a convergent position between France and the USA toward the US nuclear presence in Europe?**

The US is very in favour of it. That is why President Obama last September came forward with a new phased adaptive approach to European Missile defence in which the US offers missile and radars and whatever needed to connect them into one system, as our national contribution to a potential NATO territorial missile defence system. It is entirely intended to protect troops in the field. So the way currently NATO is looking at missile defence system, is that if we have troops involved in some place, they will be covered by NATO missile defence coverage. That's what NATO has already agreed to deal in the process of early finding. The USA wants NATO to go beyond that and also to agree to gradually expand protection to cover the territory or of all European allies. The US is working with NATO allies to take the steps necessary to ensure that the NATO systems which are dedicated to missile defence, command control get upgraded to the point that they will be able to handle a territorial missile defence role beyond the current deployed missile defence role.

- **Do you think there is a common view between the United States and France on anti-missile defence?**

There is a common perception that a threat exists . There may be different priorities in terms of how dangerous that threat currently is and what response is necessary at this point. But in the core of the discussion of the 28 allies, there is the acceptance that if we don't start working on this territorial missile defence capability now, then when the threat increases to the point where central and western Europe are being threaten by missiles from Iran or Syria, it will be too late to do something about it. That is the reason we need to start now to gradually expand our ability to cope with ballistic missile threat from the south east as it continues to grow.

- **Do you believe France and the US has the same threat perception? Syria is not considered by France as participating at the WMD proliferation or to terrorist organization.**

Syria has lots of short range ballistic missiles which can currently hit the eastern part of turkey so, at the moment there is an existing ballistic missile threat to NATO. It is a very small one, in the sense that it goes only a few hundred kilometers into turkey, but as far as Turkey is concerned, the threat has to be taken into consideration. In terms of capabilities, the ability of another nation to launch a ballistic missile attack on NATO European territory already exists. The same is valid for Iran. They are also able to hit Turkey and they are working on developing longer range and more sophisticated missiles. So, again, because there is a threat right now, in terms of capability, even without looking in terms of intention (which is the other part of any threat analysis), for allies, it would be prudent, in case such intention develops to be able to have a response which is not defending 100% of all NATO territory against any conceivable threat. But what is carefully scaled to respond to increases in the ballistic missile threat in that region and that as that threat increases so our capabilities over time. The French representative at NATO has been very receptive to those arguments.

- **Do you think there is a convergent position between France and the US regarding the US nuclear presence in Europe?**

France has very strong national views on the importance of nuclear deterrence and the importance of its own independent nuclear deterrence, and the importance of symbolism of having a NATO shared nuclear deterrent in the form of the US devices present all over Europe. NATO will continue to be a nuclear alliance. The US is looking at reducing the role of nuclear reliance but that does not mean US is looking at ignoring that nuclear capabilities do not exist right now in the world. The US wants to reduce its reliance on it, the US wants to be able to have nuclear deterrence as well as defence in a complementary way. There is a triad that is necessary in a nuclear era: you have to be able to deter attacks that can't be deterred, you have to be able to defend against attacks that can't be deterred, and if you can't deter or defend, you have to clean afterwards. NATO is involved in all 3 of these activities.

- **It seems that the United States wants to revalue the role of Turkey, whereas France, because of the problem with the integration of Turkey within the European Union, tend to marginalize its role within NATO. Do you think the United States and France have the same position on Turkey?**

That is undoubtedly one of the factors that make it difficult to achieve agreement on several issues. It is also a fact of life. There are issues regarding Turkey and Cyprus, Turkey and the membership of the European Union, and as an Ally Turkey is free to not join the consensus whenever it feels its national interest is being threaten and that can happen anytime for anything having to do with Cyprus problem. Are those issues affecting our ability to reach consensus on a new strategic concept? Absolutely they are. It is a background noise that never goes away, we are constantly remind that thos issues exist. Turkey's desire to become a member of the European Union leads to tensions and many places and not just in NATO and we definitely have to deal with them here.

- **Regarding the Partnership Policy, are there many divergences between France and United States?**

There are different emphasis, it is not just a bipolar division, it is a whole range of opinions that allies have on partnership and enlargement. We are happy keeping some countries in Partnership status for the long term without official closing the door on enlargement or do we need to be seen to be offering a real prospect to certain countries of eventually joining NATO? We wouldn't have made promesses to Georgia and Ukraine that they will NATO allies some day. Personally, I tend to view the timeline for those promesses the same I view the timeline for the non nuclear proliferation treaty and its promess that Nuclear countries will eventually disarm: Not necessarily in our lifetime. At the moment Ukraine, anyway, is not interested. But it is not a crucial issue, people are generally in agreement that there is no good reason to make an urgent plea for membership for any particular country right now. If Macedonia can solve the main issue, they will be right in front of the queue for Membership.

- **Do you think United States and France have the same idea of priorities and focusing on the same points?**

It is possible to come out with 28 different priority lists (28 countries in NATO). There may be generally the same on what we need to be able to finance but there are a lot of divergences on the fine details for capabilities, operations, missile defence (which is a high priority for some and lower for others). Given the drain on NATO finances that last operations have represented for NATO and especially for Afghanistan, all Allies are waking up the unpleasant

truth that we need to put more money into NATO just to be able to continue what we are doing now. That is a very sobering effect on people's discussions of priorities. Because what tend to happen quickly and France has been one the allies who has been asking first this question, is whenever you talk about something new, the first question is how do we pay for it? France has been very strong in making sure that all allies are aware that it is a crucial question and US agree that that there is a need for fiscal discipline. US also believe there is a need to do Afghanistan right but also not to let Afghanistan drain all of the life for all the other things that NATO should be doing and already agreed to do and is in the middle of doing in some cases. So, unfortunately, in the time of financial difficulties right now in the world, US is looking at the need for more money in NATO, if NATO continues to do what it does currently. If NATO choose to stop doing the activities it is doing now, that will also require discussion among allies.

- **Do you think the USA considers ESDP as an opportunity? What should be the place allocated to ESDP in the peace building and deterrence field?**

US sees ESDP as an opportunity for cooperation. US wants to avoid duplication of efforts, gaps in response to crisis and pre crisis situations. The standing up of capabilities by ESDP means that there is another player potentially in the field with whom NATO needs to be consulted before action is taken and ideally that consultation process will happen in the other direction as well. If the ESDP sees an opening for an operation in some place, if there is an existing NATO capability, US would prefer that rather than duplicating that capability, the ESDP would focus on complementarity in its purest sense, which to say, especially in this tight fiscal time, not spending hundred of millions Euros just to duplicate what already exist. So better communication at the early stage, to avoid overlap; the fewer overlaps we have, the easier it is to ensure there are also no gaps. Cooperation is today happening not from the top down, but empirically to deal with crisis in the real world, because it is necessary, like in Kosovo for example.

- **Do you believe a division could be established, with NATO focusing on military matters and ESDP on civilian operations?**

That could be the ideal situation, but the political situation does not guarantee that division. ESDP has so many more civilian resources than NATO does being a politico-military alliance. On the other hand, there also seem to be cases where EU seems to be more concerned about standing up its own military capability as in the case of the c... operation in 2008, and that does not speak well for practical complementarity because that was an exact duplication of what NATO was already doing. So it was more important for some allies to stand up this EU capability, to prove there is an EU capability than there was for being more regarding on the expenses it got spent.

- **France and the USA have different geographical centers of attention. How do you think this divergence can affect the negotiation of the new NATO strategic concept? (partnership policy)**

It will not necessarily affect the new strategic concept. The fact that the US has to call

Stuttgart to speak to Africom puzzle the US. History and national inclination and other logical reasons mean that there will be a different focus by different countries. It is not something that really plays into alliance discussions per se. It does not have a huge impact on the strategic concept. The USA has global interest and defence establishments, a huge command in the Pacific, a large one on the coast of America, the central command which is a flashpoint for both Iraq and Afghanistan where most of US military resources are focused there, plus the European unique alliance that US try to be part of and that require a certain amount of resources in Europe so US is global. But this does not create any particular dissension or disruption as we approach a new strategic concept. This is not a big issue which create a problem with France, US does not object France to pursue its own national interest in the areas it is more familiar with. US welcome French expertise everyday, especially in Africa. So without France, it would be some more things that someone else will have to step in a sort of vacuum.

- **Do you think Africom can be considered as a competitor to France's politique Africaine?**

I don't think there is a sort of competition in Africa, because France and the USA have so many other "press" in concern. The days of competition among nations come when someone is bored or when it has a navy or an army has nothing to do, and it is not the case right now with any of NATO allies. We are at the point of being overstretched in so many directions that there is really no time or energy free for competition. US pray for complementarity among allies as the French who are willing to undertake their focus in parts of Africa where US do not have so much background.

- **What do you think about the new French military base in Abu Dhabi and do you think there is a competition of the arms market in Middle East?**

Not really, all the major European arms manufacture are able to handle the arm's race out of the shows that they hold every year with models and bikinis and lots of champagne. They don't need to open up new military bases in Middle East in order to improve their standing in the world arms market. That is not an issue. Stabilizing and civilizing partners in Middle East is a good thing. Having a new French military base is both of those things, just regarding the fact that the power in the region would be less tempted to create mischiefs with a French military base implemented there. People will be more careful and circumspect in their actions when they understand it is not just US focusing, but also the French having a permanent military presence now in Abu Dhabi and that create more stability. So US perceives it as a positive development. If France, bringing more stability to the region, also develop its sales on the arms market, good for them.

- **To what extent the respective energetic policies of France and the USA affect their geopolitical position? Do those divergences have an impact on their views toward the new NATO strategic concept?**

Yes, it will have an impact on the NATO strategic concept, because energy security is going to be one of the things we end-up discussing. There is no bipolar division between 2 capitals. This is a very broad discussion among 28 capitals, because there are countries which are extremely dependent, for example on Russian natural gas, other countries which are uncomfortably aware of that kind of dependency taking place to the west of them and that create a broad range of opinions on the importance of energy security and what exactly a

political military alliance like NATO can do about it. Do we have the capacity to building up a new strategic reserves? I don't think so. Do we want NATO to prevent Russia from blackmailing our allies? This is a very complex and finally tuned discussion on energy security. A consensus has to reach with all allies.

- **What do you think are the respective positions of France and the United States towards Russia?**

Russia, threat or partner? Or is Russia threat and partner, a challenging partner? That is the whole discussion, to what extent do we consider Russia to be a security challenge? To what extent are we free to say that if we really think it? Russia maintains enormous military capabilities. They are not matched by economic capabilities that does not make the potential for misunderstanding threading up into something tragic any smaller. As USA and Russia still maintain the biggest nuclear arsenal in the world, and many of those weapons are close to NATO territories, with on top systems that have very short time of warning like short range ballistic missiles and there are many of them. NATO has a very small number of sub strategic nuclear weapons, Russia has a very large number. One of the things we will have to do when we get around with the next round of arms control discussions is try to figure out some way to balance this reality. But there is no demonization of Russia as public enemy number one because it is not politically possible to do that, there will never be consensus around NATO states to consider Russia as the bad guy.

- **Regarding the French sale of Mistral boats to Russia, it seems that France is much more keen to cooperate with Russia than the USA.**

It is a fair statement. The French have been very strict on what kind of technology they are willing to transfer through the Mistral sale. Having said that, it is a market, there are potential competition within NATO, so it is not just France playing that kind of thing, and it is the kind of things economic life can bring to this days. US is just hoping that export licencing requirements are respected and people keep alliance interest in their mind before they sell things like that and if both aspects have been satisfied, there are no complain.

- **Regarding the US nuclear presence in Europe, do you think France and the US have the same conception of deterrence?**

It is important to deter some threat, whether it is a purely military deterrent or to share the knowledge that we can destroy their infrastructure even using advance conventional system. That is part of the deterrence. Does it deteriorate the quality of nuclear deterrence? I don't think so but the French counterpart has an another opinion on that point. Once deterrence has failed, for whatever reason, then we need to be able to defend and in conventional terms we have had those defences in place since the late 40's. The US is looking to add defences against ballistic missiles, but it is not something essentially new, we see that as an extension of what we were already doing, an extension of the very reason for NATO to exist; it has always been about defence and not just deterrence. If the deterrence fail, what do you do next? That is why we always had defence capabilities beyond the deterrent effect we were ready to do. If deterrence and defence fail, then we need a big boom in order to be able to sweep up afterwards. We cannot judge in advance what this is going to look like, but we need to be able to do all of those things: deter, defence and then recover. NATO has always looked in the 3 directions, so I don't see the missile defence debate as being something new in terms

of high concept, it is just an extension of what we already been doing. Moreover, I don't see any particular benefit to define deterrence in an exclusively nuclear manner because we have always deterred with our conventional forces.

- **Are there industrial implications which could influence the strategic concept?**

I don't think that is what would influence the strategic concept when it comes to ballistic missile defence. We are going to agree as an alliance to have a territorial ballistic missile defence capability, this will be in time for the next summit, an agreement will be signed. Obviously, this creates an opportunity for a lot of people to sell different things, and of course all of the major companies in the defence sector will be interested in getting whatever piece of a new contract as they can, it is what they do. But I don't see that process as affecting the strategic concept. If we agree there is a ballistic missile threat and we need to do something about it. This will not be part directly to the new strategic concept, but at the same time that the new strategic concept is announced in Lisbon, that missile defence agreement will also be announced.